Authoritarianism, democracy and the climate: comparing the EU and China’s climate governance

Photo: ダモ リ (Darmau) on Unsplash

In November, 198 nations will convene in Belém, Brazil, for the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP) to discuss one thing: climate change.

Not only will it be the 30th anniversary since the first conference, but all states will release their new national determined contributions (NDCs) to limit global temperature warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

It will be a critical moment to determine if the world is on track to reach its collective targets. However, an emerging element of the climate debate is China and its achievements. China has become the largest producer of green technologies, outpacing democratic states, such as those within the European Union (EU).

This achievement gives credibility to the idea of eco-authoritarianism, which calls for authoritarian technocratic governance to push the necessary reforms that address the climate crisis.

Yet are authoritarian governments really better at tackling climate change?

Let’s find out by comparing the strengths and weaknesses of autocratic and democratic regimes, focusing on the People’s Republic of China and the European Union (EU), including its 27 member states.

The advantages of autocratic authority

Eco-authoritarian advocates highlight advantages such as centralised decision making, long-term vision and the ability to act on climate policies without fear of public backlash.  

Regarding central planning, there is little public input into climate initiatives in states like China. Instead, determining the state’s climate agenda are two central bodies: the National Leading Group for Addressing Climate Change (NLGACC) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Both institutions are at the heart of decision-making in China and are led by the Premier of China. Outside of these bodies, external input is limited to advice from experts in the National Advisory Committee on Climate Change. As a result of this centralisation, scientific research underpins regulations. It enforces a top-down approach, unhindered by lobbying or popular opposition. 

Due to this centralisation of power, top political leaders can also take decisive and quick actions to address the climate crisis. While some consideration of popular will is needed, the authoritarian regime can implement policies without much fear of backlash. Thus, authoritarian governments can direct private industries to act. Within China, due to government subsidies, the private sector has been leading the world in the production of renewable technologies. According to Climate Action Tracker, 60% of wind turbines, 70% of electric vehicles, 75% of batteries and 80% of solar panels in the global supply chain are manufactured in China. 

Through central decision-making without outside influence, authoritarian regimes can plan for the long term. This foresight is unlike democracies, which often prioritise short-term goals within an election cycle. Policies such as the five-year plans and the Made in China 2025 initiative set out both the immediate goals and long-term trajectory of the economic net-zero transition. These policies help secure the implementation of a long-term and consistent strategy that cuts carbon emissions over decades. 

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The ailments of authoritarian regimes

While autocratic regimes, such as the one in China, are effective in implementing renewable technology, there are some pitfalls to consider. 

One consequential disadvantage is the lack of public input into policies, which has many subsequent consequences that limit China’s climate policies. As detailed earlier, there are heavily centralised decision-making powers in the state. Since these policies are only underpinned by science and without civil society consultation, they become too narrow with unforeseen consequences. In northern China, there was a push to replace coal boilers in homes with cleaner gas alternatives. However, this left many residents without heating during the winter of 2017 as authorities failed to predict the surge in gas demand. 

Alongside this narrow view, further muddying policy-making, is the lack of transparency. Transparency in all stages of climate projects is necessary to identify gaps and inform future improvements. One such policy initiative was China’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which started in 2021. After facing criticism for its untransparent rules, the regime introduced new measures that made the ETS more transparent and efficient, highlighting this weakness for illiberal regimes. 

However, a lack of transparency through popular accountability can also undermine carbon reduction efforts. This is because, without public engagement, these closed political systems can sometimes focus on other governmental priorities at the expense of climate action. Without elections, authoritarian governments gain legitimacy through the outcomes of their policies. So, especially for local governments, they focus on achieving economic growth targets set by Beijing over environmental outcomes. This inconsistency undermines emission reductions that authoritarian regimes such as China are known for. 

Political corruption, which is more common in authoritarian governments, also corrodes decarbonisation efforts. Without public accountability, anti-corruption measures are enforced solely by the central government. However, in states such as China,  local governments are relatively unsupervised. As a result, there is an emerging trend of local government officials being bribed by private firms to lower environmental standards for new projects or to secure state investment. While there have been crackdowns from the central government, corruption remains a challenge that reduces the effectiveness of Chinese climate policies.

Drivers of democratic governance

After focusing on authoritarianism, let’s switch to the strength of the democratic institutions in places such as the EU and its 27 member states. 

It is easy to create an understanding of the crisis in the population by having transparency, freedom of speech and the uninterrupted flow of this scientific information. Populations become mobilised into bottom-up actors within the green transition. Through NGOs, protests, petitions, and elections, people can demand greater climate action and punish political leaders for inaction. 

Through this popular mobilisation, the EU has established citizens’ assemblies across Europe. This bottom-up approach empowers everyday people to directly express views on how to tackle climate change at a regional level. As a consequence of this popular mobilisation, citizens can push the climate agenda forward, while contributing to more holistic and practical policy solutions. 

By including the opinions, perspectives and priorities of citizens, liberal governments can create more integrated and ambitious climate policies. As a result, while China has a categorisation of  “highly insufficient” for its climate policy, all EU states in comparison are classified as slightly better at ‘insufficient‘. Yet, the EU also aims for an emissions reduction target of 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and net zero by 2050. These goals are in contrast to China, which seeks to peak emissions by 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060. 

Compounding these positive climate effects of open inclusion of people are comparably lower levels of corruption in liberal regimes. The average score of the Corruption Perception Index is 60 across all EU member states, giving it an average ranking of 36 out of 180 countries. By having less corruption, these states can ensure effective resource distribution and implementation of climate solutions. 

The limitations of liberal leadership

While there are efforts to strengthen democratic governance of climate change, this system still has its criticisms.

Lobbying plays a central role here, since profits afford access to public policy makers within democratic institutions such as the EU. From 2010 to 2018, the five biggest oil and gas companies in the bloc spent 251 million euros on costs directly employing 200 lobbyists in Brussels. This money grants these corporations significant influence. As a result, in 2014, successful lobbying forced non-binding energy targets and inadequate emission reduction targets to limit warming to 1.5 degrees in the EU’s 2030 climate targets. 

Lobbying also contributes towards polarisation, which divides societies and inhibits climate action in liberal regimes. Despite knowing the consequences for the global environment, fossil fuel industries supported research, which fueled disinformation campaigns, to question the scientifically backed narrative. This false research, alongside strategic attacks on factual research, mirrors the Tobacco Industry’s strategies to spread doubt. Consequently, there is a lessening of the public pressure on these industries to become more sustainable. Moreover, these disinformation campaigns embed themselves into people who are fearful of the cost to their livelihoods to decarbonise, leading to opposition and politicisation of the crisis. As an indirect result, right-wing populist parties across EU countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia, advocate for anti-climate policies to appeal to these voters.

This polarised effect can destroy consistency in climate policy as well. A newly elected government can overturn its predecessor’s climate policies. Polish President Andrzej Duda best demonstrated this flaw. In 2015, after his party won the parliamentary election, he reversed Poland’s previous stance on the Kyoto Protocol and vetoed the EU’s 8-year extension.

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Is this a useful framing? 

So, is eco-authoritarianism in nations such as China a good idea to follow? While there are weaknesses to the democratic approach, there are many strengths to mobilising a large population against this existential challenge. Furthermore, the effectiveness of authoritarianism is solely limited to the effectiveness of their leadership, which could lead to mixed results for a global adoption of eco-authoritarianism. 

However, this may not be the most useful lens to explore climate governance. Both democracies and authoritarian regimes have the potential to decarbonise. At the same time, either system can also act as an anchor to the fossil fuel economy. 

Instead of trying to understand the underlying dynamics and effectiveness of climate policies in a state, it is more important to consider other factors such as its developmental stage, as well as its large industries. For example, it is the fossil fuel industries from Australia, as well as Saudi Arabia and Russia, that have obstructed progress against climate change during COP negotiations. 

Now, we will have to wait and see if these industries again hold back climate goals at the next COP Summit in Brazil, or see if the world can decarbonise and avoid the worst of the climate crisis.