ASEAN’s dilemma in the Myanmar crisis: the diplomatic deadlock

Nyaung U, Myanmar. Photo: Alexander Schimmeck on Unsplash.

It has been over four years since the democratic administration of Aung San Suu was overthrown in a coup d’état, an act that caused a profound rupture in Myanmar’s political and economic stability. 

Following February 2021, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar descended into a full-scale humanitarian crisis, drawing the attention of various regional and international actors. Among these, the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) assumed a central role in diplomacy, in an attempt to de-escalate the conflict within their fellow member state.  

What led to the coup d’état?

This is not the first time Myanmar has fallen victim to military rule. Since their independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Myanmar has seen their democratic freedom stolen once before, from 1962 to 2011.  

A sole, definitive explanation outlining the motivations of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military junta) remains unclear. Addressing the question of ‘why’ requires an examination of intricate and intersecting factors. 

The dominant view holds that the Tatmadaw’s resistance stemmed from fears that democratic reforms and liberalisation would undermine its political dominance and long-standing network of business monopolies. This structure has traditionally served as a crucial source of wealth for its generals and affiliates.

Protests on the streets of Myanmar. Photo: Pyae Sone Htun on Unsplash. 

The current situation

As of 2021, Myanmar has widely been described as being in a state of civil war. In response to the Tatmadaw’s illegal and illegitimate acquisition of power, many civilians have taken to the streets in mass protests and joined people’s defence forces. This has resulted in the emergence of multiple armed groups, each driven by distinct ideals, yet all unified in their opposition to the military. 

Though collectively united against a common enemy, armed conflict inevitably brings widespread destruction and devastation. UN Special Envoy to Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, has deemed the current state of Myanmar as, “a catastrophe in terms of human suffering”, having “regional and international implications”. Myanmar’s ongoing civil war has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced virtually three million people. The nation now faces extreme inflation and severe economic instability. 

The Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group, have been disproportionately impacted by this conflict. Described by the United Nations as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”, the atrocities against the Rohingya have led to the deaths of 30,000 people and the mass exodus of 1 million refugees. Aside from the persecution by the Tatmadaw, the Rohingya have faced attacks from all sides, receiving no protection from the deposed democratic government or any of the rival factions vying for power. The democratic de-facto leader of Myanmar prior to the coup,  Aung San Suu Kyi, rejected the existence of a genocide, and disregarded any international critiques on her management of the crisis. This human rights catastrophe has garnered the attention of the international community, and placed pressure on ASEAN to address the issue.

The flags of all ten ASEAN member states. Photo: Angel Evangeline on Unsplash.

ASEAN’s response

The immediate response of ASEAN following the shock of the coup d’état was to initiate an emergency meeting in Jakarta, where a Five-Point Consensus was adopted. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus displayed proactiveness to protect the stability and peace in the region, upholding one of their primary objectives. Critics, however, argue that the agreement lacked practical value, with a heavily skewed reliance on Myanmar’s military for implementation. The reasonings behind these criticisms were largely rooted in ASEAN’s non-interference principle. Since ASEAN’s founding in 1967, there has been a strict emphasis on the independence and sovereignty of all ten member states. Although non-interference is pivotal in avoiding unnecessary conflict and upholding basic diplomatic values, it is a barrier against the management of urgent humanitarian crises. 

Over the past four years, the growing international attention on ASEAN’s handling of Myanmar has repeatedly resulted in widespread disappointment. Rather than the spotlight on ASEAN serving as an opportunity to show regional potential on a global scale, it has inadvertently highlighted weaknesses in its organisational structure and an internal divide.

Within ASEAN, there appears to be a split between democratic and authoritarian nations. The United Nations General Assembly resolution to condemn the coup and demand the release of political prisoners in Myanmar received four abstentions from ASEAN member states, with only six voting in favour. To the international community, this appeared to be quite a stark exhibition of internal strife, further raising doubts about the commitment to resolve the crisis. Thailand has also held three informal talks with Myanmar military representatives, which have been met with disapproval by democratic nations like Malaysia, who have engaged openly with Myanmar’s democratic administration. This clash has hindered the South East Asian region’s ability to put aside their ideological differences and strive harmoniously towards this pressing concern. 

Even after disregarding political ideology and system of government, each member state can still be seen undertaking and advocating for different approaches. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in January of this year, the Philippines continued insisting that a change in strategy was necessary, while Vietnam called for a comprehensive assessment of the Five-Point Consensus and political inclusion of more stakeholders. To logistically close this divide would be a complicated struggle. 

Part of ASEAN’s response is heavily attributed to the chairmanship of ASEAN. Since the emergence of this crisis, ASEAN has been chaired by Brunei (2021), Cambodia (2022), Indonesia (2023), Laos (2024) and Malaysia (2025). Each chair has brought to the table different strategies and approaches, respectively appointing a Special Envoy to Myanmar. As of 2025, consensus has been reached that ASEAN will now be actively exploring the idea of a permanent special envoy for Myanmar. This brings rise to new hopes, opening up the possibility for more consistent and transparent interactions with Myanmar. 

Notably, Brunei played a key role accommodating member states’ interests, and avoided confrontation with the Myanmar military without compromising ASEAN’s fundamental principles. As the 2021 ASEAN chair, Brunei successfully cultivated consensus around the principle that safeguarding regional stability was paramount, especially in light of the increase in displaced persons along ASEAN’s borders and cross-border illicit activity.

Despite ASEAN pursuing considerable efforts to mediate and facilitate discussion, there has been a deficiency in meaningful action necessary to combat the ongoing humanitarian emergencies in Myanmar. While some argue that a yearly rotation of the ASEAN chair leaves minimal time for proper plans to be formulated, others believe that it is a problem of unity. 

The difficulty that ASEAN now faces is that time is running out. With nations like China heightening their influence in Myanmar, the opportunity for external actors to shape regional outcomes becomes a real risk. 

Following the deferral of Myanmar’s 2026 chairmanship and the Tatmadaw’s plans to hold elections in late 2025, the world now waits to see whether ASEAN can maintain their centrality in Asia.