A Very Short History of Balkanisation – and What It Means for Iran

PHOTO: Saifee Art on Unsplash.

The early months of 2026 have seen renewed discussion of multipolarity, nationalism and the risk of wider conflict. 

Another term associated with 20th century politics has re-entered online political discourse:

Balkanisation

The term is often used to describe fears of an ethnically or culturally diverse state fragmenting into smaller, weaker, political units. Both the Ottoman Empire and Yugoslavia ‘Balkanised’ in the 20th century, and now Iran faces the same threat today.

Balkanisation

Balkanisation is the fragmentation of a larger state or region into smaller political units, often along ethnic, cultural or religious lines. The term is often used to evoke images of war-torn states, ethnic cleansing, and civil war. It is not limited only to the Balkans (a historically contested region located in South Eastern Europe defined by multiculturalism and ethnic diversity), but has had expressions in Africa and Asia. Nor is Balkanisation a phenomenon tied strictly to ethnic identity. Rather, cultural and religious practice has been used as the relevant marker across which state lines have been drawn. 

Balkanisation leads to the fragmentation of large and often thereby powerful adversarial states. The formation of many smaller states in the place of a single large state can cause a shift in the balance of power in the favor of ‘great powers’. Some argue that this advantage motivates global powers to engage in the Balkanisation of regional adversaries. 

PHOTO: Ethnic map of Iran. AA.EERROORR on Wikimedia Commons.

Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran is an ethnically and culturally diverse country with a population of about 92 million people. Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Baloch, Lurs, Armenians, Assyrians and other groups all populate Iran and contribute to its complex cultural fabric. On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel began their attack on Iran, prompting Iranian counter-strikes and a wider regional crisis. 

Minority Groups and Regional Strategy

The leaders of both the US and Israel over the course of the current conflict have issued messages to the ethnic minorities of Iran. On February 28, 2026, days after the initial strikes, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on “Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Balochis and the Ahwazis” to topple the regime. Reports later claimed that US President Donald Trump had discussed the possibility of providing military equipment and assistance to Iranian Kurdish separatists based in Iraq. Indeed as of 12 May 2026, President Trump has already accused Kurdish separatists of taking weapons provided by the US for themselves, instead of delivering them to their intended recipients (Iranian protestors of the current government). 

US and Israeli rhetoric toward Iranian minority groups may raise questions about whether ethnic divisions could be used as part of a broader regional strategy. 

There is historical precedent for major powers invoking the protection of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities to expand their influence. By the mid- to late-18th century, European powers began to act as ‘protectors’ of non-Muslim communities. France and the Ottoman Empire signed the last of the Capitulations, a series of trade and diplomatic agreements that strongly favoured French traders and diplomats, in 1740. These also gave France the right to ‘protect’ Catholic communities within the Ottoman Empire, undermining the sovereignty of the Ottomans over their territory. Similarly, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. This gave Russia special commercial and maritime privileges and allowed Russia to ‘protect’ Christian Ottomans in the Balkan region, leading to a broader sphere of influence for Russia. 

PHOTO: The former state of Yugoslavia (left) and the region with modern borders (right), created by Rahul Deepak Kumar on mapchart.net

Yugoslavia

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was the federation of six republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first Yugoslav state was formed in 1918 as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The state fell under German Nazi occupation in World War II, leading to the creation of a resistance movement. Under the leadership of Yugoslav communist Josip Broz Tito, a “national revolution was in progress at the same time as the national liberation war”.

Although the separate nationalities of Yugoslavia had a troubled history of ethnic and religious tension, post-war Yugoslavia was able to overcome difficulties and grow into a rising economic middle power that helped found the Cold-War non-aligned movement. This non-aligned status allowed Yugoslavia to play off the major powers against each other. As a founding member of the United Nations (UN), it was able to be critical of Western powers while still benefitting from Western aid and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the balance Yugoslavia struck between the major powers (the US and the USSR) was ultimately short-lived. 

NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia

In 1999, NATO began a bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (then comprising Serbia and Montenegro). Critics called the act a “war of aggression”, while supporters, including NATO officials, framed it as a humanitarian intervention intended to prevent atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serbian and Yugoslav forces. 

Scholars have pointed out the impact that the targeted bombings of civilian and industrial infrastructure had on Yugoslavia’s long-term economic capacity. The disparity between NATO’s concern for some ethnic minorities (in this case, the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999) over others (such as ethnic Serbians in Croatia in 1995) has led some to question the degree to which humanitarianism motivated NATO’s actions. Türkiye has executed military operations against Kurdish communities since 1985. In 1995, Croatia carried out the ethnic cleansing of Serbs. Despite this, Türkiye remains a NATO member and Croatia was permitted to join NATO in 2009. 

The current conflict in Gaza can be considered as a recent example of NATO’s disparity in action. Although a UN Commission has found Israeli forces had committed acts of genocide in Gaza, NATO has not taken any comparable action to intervene. 

This raises questions about whether NATO’s intervention was driven solely by concern for Albanian Kosovars or whether it also served broader strategic interests in the Balkanisation of Yugoslavia.

PHOTO: Belgrade during NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. Unknown author on Wikimedia Commons

The Precedent of Humanitarian Intervention 

Critics of NATO’s intervention argue that NATO’s stated rationale should be assessed alongside the strategic and economic effects of its bombing campaign. One such critic, political writer Michael Parenti, argued that NATO was motivated by the rational destruction of a competing state-owned economy rather than simply by humanitarian concern. Although the geopolitical circumstances surrounding Israel today differ significantly from those of the post-Cold War era, the contrast between NATO’s 1999 intervention and the absence of comparable action today remains politically significant.

For critics such as Parenti, Yugoslavia’s position as a non-aligned state without the protection of a major power (following the collapse of the USSR in 1991) helps explain why NATO targeted state-owned centres of production and infrastructure. The bombing campaign damaged not only Yugoslavia’s military capacity, but also its economic, agricultural and administrative infrastructure, leading to $100 billion worth in damages to Yugoslavia by the end of 1999.

In the 20th century, it was the capitalist/communist divide that defined ally from adversary. 

Today, however, that picture has shifted. From BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea), multipolarity is increasingly forming on the basis of opposition to US interests, rather than along strict ideological lines.

Likewise, the role and potential of Balkanisation may also be shifting. 

The Role of Balkanisation in the Iran Conflict

Balkanisation has often been a consequence of external intervention in multiethnic states, though whether it has been an explicit policy varies by case.  

In more recent times, the US-led invasion of Iraq contributed to sectarian and ethnic violence, increasing civilian casualties and continuing to affect Iraq’s stability. Though often framed as a misstep of foreign policy, the US-led intervention of Iraq set up a clear framework for the Balkanisation of the country along dominant ethnic and religious lines. The Sunni-Shia-Kurd split of Iraq had been considered by the US in its decision to not overthrow Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. Retired US Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard noted in October 2006 that this was due to the “inevitable fragmentation” of Iraq that would follow the power vacuum created by overthrowing Hussein in 1991. The documented consideration of these factors may cast some doubt on the presumption that the US didn’t foresee that an imposed federation may result in a Balkanised Iraq following its 2003 invasion. 

However, Iran differs from Yugoslavia and Iraq in several important ways. 

First, Iranian nationalism is strong across the state and promotes a view of Iran as a single nation with a continuous history. Unlike Yugoslavia, which was composed of several semi-autonomous federated republics and unlike Iraq in 2003, Iran is a highly centralised state, which is likely to make fragmentation less likely than in more politically fragile states. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran consolidated control into the office of the Supreme Leader. The centralisation of power took place over many years, with a conservative surge of power following the 1997 presidential election leading to the consolidation of power into the office of the Supreme Leader backed by a network of conservative clerics and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. 

As a unitary republic and strong security state, Iran is able to effectively coordinate political action. This allows Iran to avoid a power struggle with individual federal units with the right to veto decisions made by the national government (as in Yugoslavia) and the chaos of disparate extremist groups vying for power (as in Iraq). 

Another important consideration is the political and strategic position of groups seeking secession from Iran. Unlike the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was a comparatively organised armed group that received varying forms of external support, ethnic separatist movements in Iran appear to be in a significantly weaker strategic position.  

Kurdish separatist movements are considered the most organised and active among Iran’s minority groups. However, the division of Kurdish groups in Iran, Türkiye, Syria and Iraq makes the establishment of a united ‘Kurdistan’ politically and geographically difficult.

PHOTO: A soldier of the KRI (‘Peshmerga’) holds an AK-47 next to the KRI flag. Kurdishstruggle on Wikimedia Commons.

Furthermore, a united Kurdistan could be opposed not only by Iran, but by Iraq, Syria and Türkiye. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has functioned as an autonomous region for Iraqi Kurds since 1992. However, autonomy within Iraq does not necessarily translate into support for full Kurdish independence, partly because of the valuable oil reserves the KRI controls. 

In Syria, Kurdish people have historically been deprived of citizenship and rights, issued red identity cards instead of passports and limited language and cultural rights, in an effort to suppress Kurdish nationalism. On January 16 2026, President of Syria Ahmed al-Sharaa voiced his support for Kurdish national rights, requesting they “participate actively in building this homeland [Syria]”, but stopping short of endorsing Kurdish autonomy or independence.

Türkiye also has a complicated history with its Kurdish population. Previously engaged in a 40 year-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Turkish government has overseen the suppression of Kurdish communities, including the destruction of over 3,000 villages during the 1990s. Türkiye’s assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities have meant that Kurdish language and public recognition of Kurdish identity have been illegal, contributing to the emergence of various militant Kurdish groups within Türkiye, such as the PKK.

The opposition of Iran’s neighbours to Kurdish independence is a major factor in assessing whether Iran could be successfully Balkanised. 

Finally, the Iranian government is likely still in a strong enough position to defeat a separatist movement within its borders. Certainly, this is the position of Deputy Prime Minister of the KRI, Qubuad Talabani. Regarding the likelihood of success for a Kurdish uprising in Iran, Talabani said “I don’t think it would have been successful.” Talabani also confirmed that Iran had been very “explicit” in their request to the KRI to not “provide any support to anyone who wants to harm [Iran] from our areas [the KRI].” 

Following the June 2025 12 Day War, in which the US and Israel attacked Iran and targeted nuclear facilities, military sites and infrastructure, Iran cracked down on minority groups that were perceived to share interests with the US and Israel, demonstrating the capability of the IRGC and Iranian military to suppress dissidents and separatist movements within Iran, even in times of conflict. 

PHOTO: Akbar Nemati on Unsplash

Balkanisation does not present Iran with the same threat that it presented Yugoslavia. Despite support from external actors, the ethnic separatist movements based in Iran have a low level of organisation, and those that are sufficiently organised struggle with significant regional opposition to their aims. However, the renewed discussion of Balkanisation reflects broader shifts in the emerging global order, in which ethnic divisions and minority movements may yet still play a significant strategic role in shaping the geopolitics of the coming decades.