History v geography: understanding Australia’s approach to national defence

A tattered Australian flag flying at full mast. Photo: Vaughan Willis on Unsplash

Our current geopolitical environment is ever evolving: conflict between Russia and Ukraine rages on, famine grips Gazan communities, war crimes are alleged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Thailand-Cambodia border talks reopen old wounds over disputed territory.

The second Trump administration has further strained this already fragile system through a host of economic tariffs and domestic legal battles that have left many wondering what more is to come throughout President Trump’s tenure. China has already responded with strength to the trade war incited by the US, cementing its position as an assertive actor within the Indo-Pacific. 

Defensive has become offensive. Yet Australian defence policy remains entrenched in stagnant, myopic directives that do not consider long term challenges, like the ones we are experiencing today. It can be said that we are witnessing a polycrisis unfold: multiple global catastrophes playing out with such force that strategic shocks are now the new norm, leaving policymakers to answer the difficult question of how best to respond.

This question renews calls for a better directed national defence stratagem, if it is to withstand our current predicament. While our historical partnerships with countries like the US remain important, we must acknowledge our place in the world, and make the most of our regional potential.

‘Might is right’ : US policy developments

HMAS Waller. Photo: Horatio J. Kookaburra on Flickr

With regard to US-Australia relations, the first measure that comes to mind is the AUKUS pact: a security partnership with the US and UK aimed at promoting a  “free and open Indo-Pacific” through investment in submarine propulsion technology. Four years since its inception, this deal has been marred by overlapping interests, bureaucratic stoushes and President Trump’s signature erraticism.

Most recently, the Pentagon announced a review of the deal, signalling alarm bells in Canberra, and the belief that the US was pulling out to preserve its America First agenda. While this review remains unfinished, and the deal tentatively pushes forward, fractious cracks between Australia and its strategic cousin persist, citing “distinct economic endowments and geographic realities”.

Logo of the America First movement. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

These fault lines originate within the America First Policy. Delivered at the beginning of the year, the 17 page document outlines Trump’s key priorities, from the preservation of ‘American’ values and empowering of American businesses to the promise of dismantling the “administrative state”: undoing past executive orders with the aim of starting over for the benefit of the people. 

US foreign policy is similarly reframed, with plans to “advance American security abroad” and ensure national security serves its constituents first. This transactional retreat from ideational leadership has seen President Trump attempt to operate outside Constitutional constraints, and repackage American opportunities as commercial goods – so-called commercial diplomacy.

By advocating for the elimination and reduction of foreign threats to local businesses, US foreign policy is now inextricably linked with economic incentives, a tactic understood but never before attempted by an American leader.

Priority 6: Trump’s vision of defence and American-led security. Photo: America First Agenda

The Trump administration is rewriting US global leadership, redefining trade and defence through economic statecraft, disinformation campaigns and hard power tactics. This leaves allies like Australia to consider its own standing and policy direction, irrespective of its longstanding partner.

With respect to the Indo-Pacific, where China has begun “muscling up” in influence, and the US appears determined to remain absent from consistent cooperation, Australia has a strong opportunity to reconcile national and economic security interests, and position its defence accordingly.

Keeping China in focus

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remarkable diplomatic tour of neighbouring Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam in April was seen as a premeditated move by the leader to leverage US tensions and “pull Southeast Asia closer to Beijing’s orbit”.

While the trip drew attention from surrounding countries, Canberra remained unconcerned — instead preoccupied by a fleet of Chinese naval forces stationed in the Tasman sea. The warships conducted a series of unexpected live-fire exercises before departing, their presence delivering an unambiguous message: China is present in local waters, and capable of force.

Their display is now also referenced by some as a genuine example of why investment in AUKUS remains relevant, again placing US-Australian relations at the centre of attention.

Increasing strategic competition between China and Australia, both directly and indirectly, is not new by any means. The federal government has been moving quietly on this front, bolstering ties with Papua New Guinea in a recent display of strategic strength.

But Australian defence overall remains uncoordinated, instead pieced together by broadly defined strategic frameworks, opaque investments and imbalanced diplomatic representation. A qualitative military advantage in tandem with a structured policy regime and supporting plenipotentiary power will allay concerns that Australia is unprepared for the threats that lie over the horizon.

Where does Australia stand at the moment?

Calls for a unified strategy have not fallen on deaf ears. In the last half of the decade, ASIO and the Australian Defence Force have conducted extensive reviews and assessments into the health of our national security, establishing a National Strategy in 2024.

Focusing on a ‘Strategy of Denial’, the approach rests on ensuring that our immediate region is protected from any potential adversaries through direct integrated investment in the Australian Naval and Defence over the next decade, totalling $100 billion in growth by 2034. Meanwhile, AUKUS promises delivery of its nuclear powered submarine fleet by the 2040s, with the lifecycle likely to endure until 2053.

Geo-political developments playing out today are reminiscent of events experienced by governments past. The 2014 Abbott government imposed significant sanctions upon Russia in response to their invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, while remaining sober to Israeli settlement in the West Bank during the same period. A decade on, Australian sanctions against Russia have extended as the conflict in Ukraine passes into a twelfth year, and a shift in sentiment saw the Albanese government move to recognise a Palestinian state.

News of conflict flows steadily over time, however their foundations have been rebuilt by a now increasingly interconnected world. Rapid developments in technology and artificial intelligence bring with them new threats to comprehend, and while investing in future defence is appropriate, what about the present?

Australia: a land girt by sea

When asked whether Xi Jinping or Donald Trump would be a more reliable partner to Australia, results showed an even split — evidence that even Australians are unsure of the appropriate answer. Policymakers remain unsure too, as priorities shift with each breaking news story, each executive order, and each trough of political pressure from beyond. 

A recent Lowy Poll asking which leader would be more reliable for Australia. Graphic: Lowy Institute

As the United States charts its own course, and Chinese foreign policy simmers in the background, our island continent feels somewhat lost at sea. In the face of this present uncertainty, we must learn to tread water, or risk sinking deeper. A robust national defence strategy is one such lifesaver, so long as it balances historical perspectives with contemporary geographical considerations.