Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while undoubtedly a terrifying expansion of authoritarianism, does not represent the most serious threat to Australia by an authoritarian power. In 2022, that threat and pressure comes from China in many forms. Agents of the Chinese government have attempted to recruit Australian politicians and political candidates to advance China’s interests. China has imposed billions of dollars worth of trade sanctions on Australia as retaliation for its push for investigations into the origins of SARS-CoV-2. China has also demanded, in its infamous Fourteen Grievances, that Australia compromise on fundamental elements of its liberal democratic foundations. Additionally, a deal with the Solomon Islands to base Chinese military equipment in the country has the potential to threaten Australia’s security directly.
Australia has taken a number of steps to resist this pressure. It has legislated to crack down on foreign political interference. It has found export markets alternative to the Chinese market. It has simply refused to cede any one of the Fourteen Grievances. Yet there is another move that has proven more controversial than the other three: it has sought closer relations with India.
At first glance, it may not be clear why this move is so controversial. From a historical viewpoint, it is worth noting that Australia-India relations have not always been so positive. In 2009, they suffered dearly as a result of a series of violent attacks committed on Indian students in Australia. Against this backdrop, it makes sense that the Australian government would seek to improve relations with India. And from a present-day viewpoint, a number of factors appear to vindicate this move, from both Australian and Indian (and broader) perspectives.
From an Indian perspective, the most important factor is that India has its own serious disputes (and even physical conflicts) with China. In May 2020, a series of skirmishes between Chinese and Indian soldiers began on the Sino-Indian border, skirmishes that continue to this day. One contributing factor to the skirmishes is a troubling indicator of China’s attitudes and behaviour: China, for some time, has used “salami slicing” tactics in many places, including in India, to expand its territory. This term refers to the gradual expansion by one country into another’s territory in increments small enough that they do not push back, whether immediately or at all. Amidst this expansion, the skirmishes were triggered by China’s objection to India building military roads in the area.
The skirmishes have played an important part in India seeking closer security ties with Australia. In September 2021, as the world marked the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh invited Australia to be a part of producing and developing defence equipment in India. Furthermore, India understands that such ties are a necessity for itself, not a mere preference: during last year’s 9/11 commemorations, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that India has “a geopolitical environment which is in rapid flux and must, bilaterally and with other like-minded partners, respond adequately to safeguard our national interests”. Even opponents of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, the United States and Japan have conceded that “it would seem as if India must need all the help it can get.”
Meanwhile, from an Australian perspective, it stands to reason that if India needs Australian support and assistance in protecting its national security, they would be willing to offer a lot to Australia in return. And, in the form of a free trade agreement with Australia signed at the beginning of April, that’s exactly what it’s done. The deal will eliminate tariffs on 85% of Australian exports to India, a number that will eventually rise to 91%. Furthermore, many of the exports benefitting from the eliminated or reduced tariffs are exports that China has blocked or restricted. It’s no wonder that the Australian government has touted the deal as one that will reduce Australia’s economic dependence on China.
Other factors support the move as well. India, unlike China, is not a totalitarian regime with imperialist ambitions. It is thus unlikely to pull the economic and diplomatic rug out from under Australia at the first sign of disagreement. India is also an Asian country, thus close ties could signal to other Asian countries that Australia, despite its modern society having European foundations, is ready and mature enough to expand its engagement with the continent. If, as a result of such engagement, other Asian countries are persuaded to align with Australia’s positions on regional issues, China might have its expansionist tendencies curtailed even further.
So, from closer ties between the two countries, Australia gets a massive economic boost, India gets a significant security boost, and territories in China’s eye (such as Taiwan), as well as the liberal international order more generally, benefit from a check on China’s power. What could be wrong with that?
As it turns out, quite a lot. The problem is closer ties between the two countries stem largely from domestic Indian politics.
China has earned significant ire from Australia for its gross human rights violations, such as its surveillance state and mass internment of (and quite possible genocide against) Uighur Muslims. While significantly more democratic and liberal than China, India nonetheless has serious human rights problems itself. Chief among them is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is seeking to turn India into a homeland for Hindus above all other religious groups — an ideology known as Hindu nationalism.
Growing Hindu nationalism in India has led to severe and pervasive discrimination against non-Hindus, especially Muslims, which are India’s largest religious minority. The worst of this arguably culminated in December 2019, when India’s parliament passed a bill granting citizenship to refugees in India from a wide variety of religious backgrounds — except Muslims. A protest against the bill in February 2020 was followed by clashes with Hindu nationalists, which triggered nearly a week of riots in the city of Delhi. 53 people died, 36 of whom were Muslims.
Australia has sought to portray its stance on China as, in large part, a principled, pro-human-rights-based stance, and not merely one borne of self-interest (though denying the latter point entirely would be completely implausible). This portrayal is important in efforts to persuade neutral countries to side with Australia over China. Thus, when Australia is viewed as insincere in its concern for human rights, its efforts of persuasion are more likely to be rebuffed. At this year’s Winter Olympics (which Australia boycotted diplomatically), Papua New Guinea and China signed a joint statement where they committed to opposing “interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of democracy and human rights.”
Closer ties with India risk causing Australia’s human rights commentary to be viewed as a mere “pretext” even more. Standing up to China’s persecution of Muslims while emboldened by economic decoupling from China, yet at the same time, turning a blind eye to India’s mistreatment of Muslims while growing economically dependent on India, would not do its human rights image much good. (Australia’s image as a defender of Muslims is also tarnished by its being the birthplace of the perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch Massacre, in which 51 Muslims were killed.)
Ultimately, the Australian government has determined that when it comes to relations with India, these risks are worth taking. Realism and self-interest have mostly triumphed; liberal concerns for human rights are a second-order priority. The government might nonetheless seek to maximise the liberal influence it can exert on India to improve its human rights record, but not at the expense of Australian interests. Only time will tell if the right balance has been struck, in both strategic and moral terms.
