BY NICHOLAS BUTLER –
Since the Troubles ended in 1998, Northern Ireland has been searching for a way to allow its two communities, with often diametrically opposed identities, interests and aspirations, to live together peacefully. Intriguingly, these communities — loyalists/unionists and republicans/nationalists — are political (and somewhat religious), rather than racial, religious, or economic. Mostly Protestant loyalists identify as British and wish for Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom (UK), while mostly Catholic republicans identify as Irish and wish for it to leave the UK and reunite with the Republic of Ireland. This division was and continues to be the catalyst of Ireland’s violent past and uncertain future.
The post-Troubles peace has perhaps never been more fragile; earlier this year, Northern Ireland saw mostly loyalist-perpetrated rioting, widely considered its worst in a decade. The riots were triggered by the decision of the Northern Irish police not to prosecute anyone who attended the thousands-strong funeral of former Irish Republican Army (IRA) commander Bobby Storey. Storey died in June 2020, and loyalists alleged that his funeral breached COVID restrictions. However, that anger behind the riots was fuelled in the first place by the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) — a controversial solution to the difficulties caused by the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU).
The NIP’s origins lie partly in the end of the Troubles (and partly in economic considerations). The IRA, the biggest and most famous republican paramilitary organization, stopped fighting the Troubles in large part on the condition that there would be no hard border between North and South. This allowed republicans to treat the two as functionally one country. But thanks to Brexit, a non-EU country (the UK) shares a border with an EU country (Ireland). Goods entering the EU from a non-EU country must be subject to customs checks to ensure compliance with EU standards, and a hard border between North and South may have been necessary to make this possible. But with the remnants of the IRA, calling themselves the “New IRA”, threatening violence if this came to fruition, a hard border was widely recognized as unacceptable. Instead, the UK and the EU agreed that goods exported from the UK to Ireland would first be sent to Northern Ireland, checked at Northern Irish ports, and then sent on to Ireland.
This was unacceptable to loyalists, who felt that it cut off Northern Ireland (which remains in the EU single market) from mainland Britain (which does not). In March, the Loyalist Communities Council, an organization representing the loyalist paramilitary organizations that fought in the Troubles, announced that it was withdrawing its support for the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which brought the Troubles to an end, citing the Protocol. But as well as anger, there is also desperation: loyalists recognize that a united Ireland has never been closer.
So what are the factors affecting the likelihood of Irish reunification and of maintaining the status quo? And how can peace best be secured whichever of the two options prevails long term?
The best hope republicans have for reunification is the EU. Despite loyalists traditionally outnumbering republicans in Northern Ireland, more than 55% of Northern Irish voters voted against Brexit in 2016. Joining the Republic of Ireland would mean rejoining the EU; some number of moderate, anti-Brexit loyalists may be willing to drop their loyalism entirely to achieve this. If Brexit does indeed end up damaging Northern Ireland economically, expect this number to increase.
Another factor benefiting republicanism is loyalism’s lack of support outside Northern Ireland: in 2019, just 35% of the English public wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the UK, and in 2018, 63% of Leave voters preferred breaking up the UK to not leaving the EU. The GFA establishes that to bring about a united Ireland, the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland must call a referendum on the issue for the North, which must then be passed by voters. A lack of popular pressure outside Northern Ireland to not call a referendum would be a boost to republicans.
But some circumstances make a united Ireland less likely.
For example, the South must agree to it in a referendum as well. And while support for reunification has long been much stronger in the South, which has never had a British-identifying majority, it is far from unanimous. Northern Ireland is expensive to govern, and 54% of those in the South would not be willing to pay more taxes to fund a united Ireland. And with sectarian violence a far greater problem in the North than the South, some in the South may be unwilling to make it a part of their country officially.
Another factor holding back Irish reunification is the past. Many republicans have mixed feelings about the IRA; while they acknowledge that it killed scores of innocent people during the Troubles, they are also aware that an end to its violence was brought about by substantial improvements to the rights of Northern Irish Catholics and republicans (who were once treated terribly by British state authorities). As a result, pro-IRA sentiments are sometimes expressed publicly, at Sinn Féin campaigning events and victory parties, at Gaelic sports matches, and even at concerts. This, understandably, makes loyalists very uncomfortable. Perhaps thousands of young people chanting “ooh, ah, up the RA” (an infamous pro-IRA chant) at a concert can be ignored while Northern Ireland remains in the UK, but it’s far more intimidating in a united Ireland. Should the North hold a referendum on reunification, republicans would need at least some Protestants to vote for it, and these exhibits are likely to increase Protestant anxiety about the prospect.
Whichever course is eventually adopted long-term, stability demands respect for both communities’ identities and heritages as an integral part of whichever country they end up in.
Should the status quo be maintained, the most pressing need to ensure respect for republican heritage is the passage of Acht na Gaeilge — an Irish Language Act — for Northern Ireland, which loyalist parties have long strongly opposed. The UK Parliament passed a Welsh Language Act for Wales as early as 1993; republicans understandably feel insulted that they are denied equal treatment in this regard.
Were Irish reunification to occur, the Irish will have to accommodate British-identifying Protestants in their historically Catholic country. This may mean changing their flag and national anthem. It may mean accepting street parades by the Orange Order — the Protestant fraternal organization widely considered anti-Catholic. It would almost certainly mean having to drop any nostalgia for the IRA.
Optimistically, questions of identity have been answered more constructively in recent times. The language dispute has been partly resolved, with the loyalist DUP agreeing to protections for Irish, and Sinn Féin agreeing to like protections for Ulster-Scots. (Ulster-Scots is the dialect of the Scots language, a Germanic language highly mutually intelligible with English, that is spoken by some loyalists and Protestants in Northern Ireland.) A plan to protect both is on its way to becoming law.
Whatever happens, this respect is so important because both communities are highly suspicious of any perceived attempt to suppress their identities. If they conclude that any perceived attack on their identity is not a price worth paying for peace, peace will not last.
