The Post-War Era has seen the advent of regional integration through formal and informal multilateral organisations. While those such as the European Union and African Union are well known, the Australian Government should give further attention to those organisations within our geographic proximity, which play a vital role in facilitating regional cooperation. In the Pacific, this is evident with the Pacific Islands Forum (‘PIF’). However, just as environmental and COVID-19 related issues make dialogue between the bloc more important, it has recently fractured with five member-states withdrawing over leadership tensions. This gives Australia a unique opportunity to cement its position in the Pacific as a regional power, an aim the Morrison Government has strived for since coming to office in 2018.
What is the Pacific Islands Forum?
The PIF is an inter-governmental organisation with the direct aims of encouraging cooperation between countries and territories in the Pacific Ocean. This includes the facilitation of trade, peacekeeping operations, and collaboration between national governments on regional projects through ministerial dialogue. Founded in 1971, at its peak it comprised 18 members, along with one associate member, 10 observers, and 18 dialogue partners.
The PIF commenced as an informal body for communication on trade, education, travel, and development. Since 1971 this has been hosted annually. During its 50-year history, it has altered its legal framework from that of a trade bureau in 1972 to the Secretariat containing four divisions:
- Development and Economic Policy;
- Trade and Investment;
- Political, International and Legal Affairs; and
- Corporate Services.
In July 2014, the Forum endorsed the Framework for Pacific Regionalism which outlines aims and objectives supporting a broader goal of deeper regionalism. The Forum is also in the midst of completing its 2050 Strategy, which is expected to be completed this year. The strategy will be proposals to address 1,102 drivers of change which have been collated and narrowed down to a provisional list of 20 main drivers.
The PIF’s current crisis
In February 2021, Henry Puna, former Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, was elected 9-8 as the next Secretary-General, succeeding Dame Meg Taylor of Papua New Guinea. This led to a backlash from the Micronesian members – Palau, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Nauru – with the leaders claiming a “gentlemen’s agreement” has been breached as the leadership should have rotated to them.
The withdrawal of the Micronesian member-states does not mark the end of the crisis. Their departure from the Forum is a 12-month process in which each country has their own withdrawal strategy. This means there is leeway to either retain them as members of the PIF or to at least have them still connected in some form, be it through associate membership or some other partnership.
Similar crises have been evident in recent years in other continents. The most notable example was the leadership crisis in the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Members could not come to an agreement on the organisation’s future leadership with Venezuela, Bolivia and Suriname blocking the nomination of Argentine Jose Octavio Bordon. Tensions further exacerbated over criticisms of the Maduro Government. This led to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru forming the Lima Group in August 2017 and then suspending their membership of UNASUR in April 2018. They, along with Ecuador and Guyana, went on to form the Forum for Progress and Development.
While the situation was vastly different in South America – with questions of democracy a cause for the splintering of UNASUR, the path forward gives us some guidance and clues into what may be next for the PIF. Over the next 12 months, we may see a rival organisation rise, or it may be the opposite with a compromise made over the Forum’s leadership.
Consequences for Australia
Australia has much to lose from the splintering of the PIF. However, it also has much to gain, and this is an opportunity for it to utilise diplomatic manoeuvring to exert further influence in the region. This is an increasing necessity in the 2020s with the Pacific becoming a hotbed for Sino-American tensions and a way in which Australia can cement its position as a regional power.
The Morrison Government has shifted foreign policy attention to the Pacific since coming to office in 2018. The Pacific Step-Up strategy is the Government’s policy to work more closely with neighbouring countries on the economy, political stability, regional stability, and other issues such as climate change. Further efforts in the region have been reflected by the creation of the Office of the Pacific in 2019 and the establishment of the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP). The latter started to fund projects in late-2020 with a hydro-power system in the Solomon Islands, undersea cable for Palau, and a solar farm in Papua New Guinea. The AIFFP recently allocated $300 million to further infrastructure projects.
The disintegration of the PIF has come at a less than ideal time. The Pacific nations will face what the Lowy Institute has called a “lost decade”. This is a result of the Pacific being placed under further financial strain due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the region’s few income streams, specifically tourism. The fracturing of the Forum also presents the Pacific as a somewhat weaker front in the lead up to COP26 in November. This is instead of the unified force they need to present to seek additional economic support and assistance from wealthier countries due to the consequences of the climate crisis.
For Australia, the break-down of the Forum presents further hurdles in integrating further with the region. Instead of the Australian Government working with all nations under one body, it will need to work through a myriad of organisations. While this will not stagnate the efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the wider Government, it will no longer have the ease of the region’s principal political grouping to seek deeper cooperation with all nations.
While the fracturing is not in Australia’s interest, it offers an opportunity for the Government to spearhead efforts to heal the rift. After the announcement of the split, Minister for International Development and the Pacific Zed Seselja commented that “we need to listen to [the Micronesian leaders], we need to engage in dialogue, we need to continue working together on the important challenges that the region faces”. With Australia so focused on further regionalism, it may be that governmental resources could be diverted to either bringing the Micronesians back to the PIF, facilitating reform of the body as a compromise, and potentially offering incentives. This would make Australia at the centre of the PIF in the years to come, underpinning the Forum as we progress through the next decade and giving the Government further opportunities to cooperate with our neighbours.
Conclusion
The PIF’s fragmentation does not mean Pacific regionalism is a failure, nor does it jeopardise Australia’s ambitions to integrate further with our neighbours. Yet, it makes it more complicated and is not in the interests of the Australian Government and our regional partners who need to collaborate now more than ever. Over the next few months we will see the trajectory of the PIF and whether the remaining members will be open to compromise with the former Micronesian members or if the relationship will be redefined in a much looser manner.
