In the heart of Shandong province, Zibo’s streets are filled with a smoky allure. Barbecues have become a symbol of cultural resistance against the societal pressures of post-Covid China. This ‘BBQ City – Zibo‘ phenomenon contrasts sharply with ‘Runology,’ a term encapsulating the yearning of many young Chinese to break free from their homeland. These seemingly disparate phenomena provide a unique lens to examine the socio-political dynamics of post-Covid China, weaving together a tapestry of interconnected factors – plummeting birth rates, the ‘lay flat‘ movement of passive resistance, the aftermath of the CCP’s stringent Zero Covid Policy, the self-proclaimed ‘last generation,’ and the symbolic ‘Kong Yiji’s Long Gown.’
Two Sides of the Same Coin – to Zibo or Zouxian
Zibo’s barbecue culture emerged as an antidote to the pent-up longing for normalcy in the wake of China’s Zero-Covid Policy. Amidst the lingering fear of pandemic life, Zibo offered an escape, its barbecues symbolizing liberation from the dreariness of restricted living. The city transformed into a vibrant festival of flavours, a culinary Coachella, where visitors could pose with mascots resembling skewered meat against a backdrop of LED flames. The city’s warmth was palpable, starkly contrasting with the sterile, distanced interactions elsewhere. Strangers shared tables, a testament to the trust and camaraderie that had become a rarity in other Chinese cities.
Simultaneously, as Zibo’s barbecue culture flourishes, ‘Runology’ emerges, encapsulating the desperate lengths many young Chinese are willing to go to escape their homeland. ‘Runology‘ is a term that describes the increasing trend of Chinese citizens, particularly the younger generation, seeking to emigrate from their homeland. A cocktail of repressive politics, economic struggles, and the urge to protect children from indoctrination are driving this trend. The term ‘Runology’ is a pun on the English word ‘Run,’ symbolizing the act of fleeing or emigrating.
The rise of ‘Runology’ has been particularly noticeable in the wake of China’s stringent Zero-Covid Policy. The policy’s draconian measures and the subsequent impact on daily life have exacerbated discontent and disillusionment among the populace, prompting many to contemplate leaving the country.
Traumatic Remainder of the “Last Generation” – The Shanghai Lockdown
The 2022 spring lockdown in Shanghai, one of the country’s most populous and vibrant cities, has further fuelled this sentiment. Residents of the city confined to their homes have been subjected to frequent testing, forcing their displacement to quarantine facilities, which has exacerbated their frustration and disillusionment.
This discontent is not limited to the physical constraints imposed by the lockdown. It strikes on a deeper, more existential level, as evidenced by the emergence of the phrase ‘the last generation.’ When a young resident was forced to leave his home for quarantine and threatened that his descendants would be forbidden to participate in the civil servant exam if he did not comply, he shouted the phrase in the Shanghai lockdown. The phrase “we are the last generation,” a poignant testament to the growing despair and disillusionment among young Chinese, has rapidly become their generation’s rallying cry. This sentiment, a reflection of their perceived misfortune of being the hardest hit since the 1980s, directly responds to the strict enforcement and the following impact of Beijing’s zero-Covid policy.
Passive, but not Aggressive — Lay Flat, 996 and Kong Yiji’s Long Gown
The country’s absence of robust labour standards has precipitated a scenario where the younger workforce is subjected to extended working hours, culminating in a state of burnout. This financial strain, societal pressures, and the aftermath of the Zero-Covid Policy have led many young Chinese to ‘lie flat.’ The “lying flat’ movement is not just a form of passive resistance against societal pressures but also a reaction to the harsh financial realities of life in China.
They are opting out of the rat race in “996,” which refers to expecting employees to work from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week. And they are now choosing instead to lead a simple lifestyle that rejects the societal anxiety and norms of success. This movement is another form of resistance against the pressures and expectations imposed by the CCP and society. It is a silent protest against the mandate to engage social reproduction for the ruling class. However, the rest who had found a job are burdened with status anxiety, fearing being seen as inferior or less successful than others if they cannot find a decent one.
Yet, the ruling class continues to gaslight the youth, as seen in the ‘Kong Yiji’s Long Gown‘ phenomenon. The ‘Kong Yiji’s Long Gown’ phenomenon, inspired by Lu Xun’s short story about a failed scholar, has become a powerful symbol of disillusionment and discontent among China’s youth. The ‘long gown’ worn by Kong in the story represents the divide between the educated rich and the uneducated poor. The state-owned news agency People’s Daily’s advice for students to ‘take off the long gown’ and find whatever jobs they can is seen as a call to lower their social status, which has sparked significant resistance. However, the CCP’s call for college graduates to take up labor jobs is seen as a call to lower their social status. This advice has sparked significant resistance, with many young people choosing to ‘lie flat’ or seek opportunities elsewhere rather than succumb to these pressures.
One-fifth of the 16-to-24 are Jobless
The high unemployment rate among Chinese youth, particularly college graduates, further exacerbates Status Anxiety. Many young people fear being perceived as less viable than their peers if they cannot find a single job. In China’s economic landscape, the youth unemployment rate has increased since its initial tracking in 2018. This phenomenon brings to the fore substantive apprehensions regarding the economic well-being of the nation. The process of recuperation from the economic contraction has manifested itself in a more lethargic and disparate manner than initially projected. This is particularly evident in sectors that attract a high proportion of educated youth, including technology, education, and medicine, where the struggle for recovery persists. This mismatch between the jobs that college graduates want and the available jobs has led to a surge in Status Anxiety among young people, further fuelling the ‘lying flat’ movement and the ‘Runology’ phenomenon.
Everything, Everywhere, All at Once
The phenomena of ‘BBQ City – Zibo’, ‘Runology’, low birth rates, the ‘last generation’, and the ‘lay flat’ movement can indeed be seen as different expressions of a broader non-violent non-cooperation movement among the youth in China. Non-violent non-cooperation emerges as a variant of passive resistance, wherein individuals, guided by their moral compass, refuse to adhere to laws or demands perceived as unjust.
In the case of ‘BBQ City – Zibo’, the communal atmosphere and the trust among strangers that is fostered in this space can be seen as a form of non-cooperation with the sterile, distanced interactions that have become the norm in post-Covid China. By participating in this vibrant barbecue culture, individuals are subtly resisting the societal pressures and constraints imposed by the government’s Zero-Covid Policy. The choice of this destination reveals the deep desire of the participants and the youth for basic mutual trust amongst society, a value that has been eroded in the wake of the pandemic.
On the other hand, the ‘Runology’ phenomenon represents a more direct form of non-cooperation. Choosing to depart from their homeland, these individuals are pushing back against the societal standards and demands enforced by China’s government and society. Their departure signifies a stand against the political environment, economic struggles, and other challenges they encounter in China. They are in pursuit of liberty and human rights in the United States and the West, drawn by the allure of a perceived superior quality of life.
Low birth rates, the ‘last generation’, and the ‘lay flat’ movement can also be seen as forms of non-cooperation. In a conscious act of resistance against societal norms, youth are opting for childlessness, thereby challenging the traditional narrative of family life. The ‘lay flat’ movement, where individuals choose to live a life without much consumption and even getting married, is another form of passive resistance against societal pressures and expectations of climbing the status ladder.
These phenomena are different responses to the same underlying conditions – the societal pressures and constraints imposed by the government’s policies. Faced with a crossroads, some are venturing abroad for new opportunities, while others find comfort within their homeland’s borders. Despite their apparent dissimilarity, these phenomena are interconnected, reflecting the intricate sociopolitical dynamics of contemporary China. In a rapidly changing sociopolitical landscape, they represent a generation’s struggle for autonomy, dignity, and a meaningful life.
Post-Covid China is a hotbed of discontent, with phenomena like ‘BBQ City – Zibo’, ‘Runology’, low birth rates, the ‘last generation’, and the ‘lay flat’ movement painting a picture of a generation seeking autonomy and dignity amidst rapid societal changes and stringent government policies. These movements, while diverse, share a common thread – a non-violent non-cooperation against societal pressures. As China charts its course in the post-Covid era, these voices of discontent will continue to shape its socio-political landscape. The future of China, therefore, is not just in the hands of its rulers, but also its youth who are redefining contemporary Chinese society. However, it’s crucial to remember that these movements, while significant, don’t represent all Chinese youth. Many still succumb to societal pressures, highlighting the complex interplay between resistance and conformity in post-Covid China.
