The Emperor’s New Groove? China’s Reimagined Image

Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Pivot or MIAS.

Introduction

China has an image problem, and it’s going to take more than a pointed rewatch of My Fair Lady to solve. No state on Earth has ever gone through such a drastic reversal of economic fortunes as China has. In the last couple of decades over 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty and is poised to become the world’s largest economy as early as 2028. This has coincided with an increase in its ability to project military and financial power across the globe. However, China’s diplomatic ability has not seen the same dramatic improvements, at least not until recently. Now more than ever, China appears committed to integrating itself into the global leadership system and shaping it in its own image. To this end it has embarked on several efforts to transform its image on the global stage and with individuals on a smaller scale.

Why China Wants a New Image

China has seen dramatic economic growth and improvement in recent history, but true legitimacy within established systems of international governance has largely eluded it. The United States remains, albeit tenuously, the most influential state or entity globally. As such, China has not been able to influence global events and systems as much as its wealth and power would typically allow. This difficulty largely stems from issues with its image that derive from a range of factors: from its arguably disastrous human rights record, to its crackdown on Hong Kong democracy protests to its authoritarian government. 

79% of American citizens register an ‘unfavourable’ perception of China, a staggering figure considering how polarised the United States (and indeed the Western world at large) has been of late. This poor image is not limited to the United States. Across the Western world the percentage of citizens holding unfavourable views of China has risen on average by 15% since 2011. The situation is less negative in developing regions, especially within Africa. Nonetheless, as long as the West continues to hold most of the World’s wealth and diplomatic capacity, China will continue to rely on the West, and vice-versa.

To maintain China’s astounding economic growth and influence it must maintain a degree of positive goodwill within the global community, especially within the private sector and so called ‘civil society’, where much decision-making power is concentrated. 

Africa — China’s China

Whilst many in the West remain somewhat hostile to China, there is a region where they maintain stellar relations. Across Africa, China enjoys a ‘positive or somewhat positive’ rating across 63% of African residents. This was the highest result out of all political entities addressed by non-profit Ghanometer’s yearly poll, even outpolling the African Union by 10%. This goodwill largely stems from the significant trade relationship between the two entities, as China continues to be Africa’s largest economic partner. This relationship extends from bilateral trade to free-flowing credit for infrastructure projects — between 2000 and 2019, China entered $153 billion USD worth of loan agreements with African states. This relationship has enabled millions to be lifted out of poverty alongside dramatic improvements in living standards and consumer and business confidence. Whilst there have been concerns about predatory loan practices and human rights abuses within Chinese-run projects in Africa (particularly within the manufacturing industry, which has been marred by sweatshop-like practices), on the whole China has cultivated a similar relationship to the one it held with the West decades ago.

As Africa’s voice within the international community rises alongside its relative economic power, China is quickly gaining steadfast allies (if not by ideology, at least by economic dependence) with whom it can more easily remake the rules of international trade, diplomacy and cooperation.

The Beijing Winter Olympics

The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics are not the first example of a nation using sport to manipulate its global image. It’s not even the first time that Beijing has hosted the Olympic Games for such a purpose. The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics provide a perfect example of the fascinating interplay between politics, sport and nationalism. This Olympics’ legacy was one of a new great power announcing itself on the world stage, with the funding, logistics and ceremony benefitting one of the world’s fastest growing economies. It represented a dramatic departure from China’s previous method of international relations, characterised as “Hide your strength, bide your time” by former Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping. Here was a nation unafraid to publicly display its growing unity, power and influence. The rewards of this event would come to span social, economic and diplomatic benefits, as China began to come into its own.

The 2022 Winter Olympics were designed to serve a similar purpose, but have been overall far less successful in their efforts, largely due to concerns over Peng Shuai and Uyghur “re-education” camps in the Xinjiang Province. After accusing a high-ranking Communist Party official of sexual assault, tennis player Peng Shuai had not been publicly visible for some time, leading to concerns about a “forced disappearance”. International outrage reached a fever pitch around the time of the 2022 Olympics causing Shuai to “resurface” and give an interview claiming she was not sexually assaulted or under any duress.

Even more prominent was the Chinese government’s oppression of the minority Uyghur population in north-east China, consisting of state actions, such as the organisation of prison camps and forced ‘re-education’, that have frequently been described as genocidal by some international observers. China claims that these “re-education” camps are humanitarian efforts designed to “eradicate extremism” that is allegedly abundant within the Uyghur minority. Investigations by international bodies and news organisations have uncovered horrific conditions within these camps as well as a systematic repression of Uyghur culture, with the ostensible aim of wholly integrating Uyghurs into Han Chinese culture. This has occurred alongside allegations of systemic programs of sexual assault and rape perpetrated against Uygher women being held in such camps. Such human rights abuses led multiple human rights bodies to warn against allowing China to “sportswash” away their abuses, as well as numerous states (including the US and Australia) choosing to engage in a diplomatic boycott of the games.

Notably, regions where China has been heavily investing in building goodwill, such as Africa, have been absent from this wave of criticism. This suggests that China’s vast economic gamble in these areas has, for the time being, largely paid off. Nonetheless, the 2022 Olympics were not the buoying success that the CCP had hoped for and instead served to direct global attention to the worst of its abuses.

Conclusion

China’s belligerent style of “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” has begun to wear increasingly thin amongst the international community. A growing number of states are becoming alienated by China’s aggressive rhetoric and its government appears to have detected the need for change.

Its efforts so far have been fairly ineffectual, with a large focus on swaying neutral states to their side through extravagant financial support, rather than engaging in constructive discourse with alienated states. Efforts to engage with such states have largely been superficial and had the opposite of the intended effect, such as the 2022 Winter Olympics.

Nonetheless, China remains economically and diplomatically indispensable to the international system and such a fact is unlikely to change with any rapidity. But China has recognised the downsides to its current image and is taking more and more steps to address this. If recent Chinese history can teach us anything, it’s that it is capable of profound change when it deems a situation worthy of it.

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