Indonesia: Swept under the Carpet

Content warning: this article contains content relating to massacre, war, and violence.

On a single day in 1965, an Indonesian coup rapidly turned into a full-frontal massacre, resulting in an estimated 500,000 to three million deaths.1 Although the September 30th Movement, as it later became known, was ranked alongside “war crime[s] of the same type as those the Nazis perpetrated”,2 many parts of this story have regrettably not been told. The atrocities committed as a result of this coup have been largely concealed — unfortunately swept beneath Indonesian and foreign governments’ carpets, for purely economic and strategic aims.3 This event changed the course of Indonesian politics and pushed onlookers to question just how justifiable covert preventative action is. The United States (US) heavily contributed to this atrocity through covert military programs and overt CIA involvement, support and persuasion. Therefore, the story revealing the United States’ involvement in the results of the September 30th Movement needs to be acknowledged and confronted. 

In the early hours of the 1st of October, 1965, the September 30th Movement assassinated the commander of the Indonesian Army and five generals.4 This movement, also called the Gestapu, was in response to President Sukarno’s lack of action against the nation’s famine and his soft policies towards Communists.5 However, by late afternoon the coup had failed in Jakarta, and General Suharto assumed leadership of the army, who immediately adopted an anti-communist stance and blamed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for the deaths.6 Ultimately, this stance, encouraged by the US, led to the Cold War’s infiltration in Indonesia, the subsequent complete purge of the PKI, and the takeover of government by the army.

Origins of the United States’ Involvement

Following 1945, the US and the Soviet Union became locked in the Cold War. In an effort to counter Soviet influence, America began its direct involvement in Indonesia in the late 1950s, following Communism’s rise in the region,7 as shown by China’s fall to Communism in 1949 and the 1950 Korean War. President Dwight Eisenhower’s main foreign policy instrument was containment, and in 1954 he spoke of the Domino Theory, which outlined how one event, such as the “loss of China” could catalyse communist takeovers in neighbouring states.8 Today, this concern has been regarded by post-revisionist historians as exaggerated and as a tool used to justify American interference in vulnerable countries such as Indonesia. Indonesia’s location and size were also of great economic and geo-political advantage, and that is another reason given by the American government as to why they felt the need to safeguard it against Communism.9

President Sukarno, although loved by his people, walked what was described by Western historians as “a very fine line” with the US.10 During his tenure as president, although not Communist himself, Sukarno adopted a neutral foreign policy, involving a precarious balance between the Indonesian Army and PKI. Through this balance, the PKI managed to be the largest political party in Indonesia in 1957 and the largest Communist party outside of the Soviet Union and China. It was consequently assumed by America that Sukarno was giving the PKI a “direct path” to winning Indonesia’s democratic elections.11

United States’ Participation in Devising a Coup

In the years preceding the September 30th Movement’s coup, the US was busy setting the stage for a showdown in Indonesia. The US was teaching the Indonesian Army and offering them resources and financial aid, so they would have the skills and confidence to steal power from the PKI at a suitable time.12

America’s first substantial contribution was the commencement of a military assistance program in 1958,13 which had the aim of equipping the Army for a takeover of power. This already significant effort was additionally accompanied by a training exchange program that served to train 28,000 Indonesian officers at institutions such as Fort Bragg until 1965. Through these programs, the US gave itself the opportunity to create vast connections to all “key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable of resisting Communist takeover”.14 All up, the US spent USD$10–20 million annually on Indonesian military assistance, and hit a maximum on spending in the four years preceding the coup.

To further evidence the US involvement, there exist a range of CIA documents and declassified conversations that reveal America’s intentions for anti-Communist leadership. Firstly, the United States understood that Sukarno would have to remain in power; however, only as a figurehead of the Army’s new government. It was observed by Washington in 1965 that “[n]o force in the country [could] attack him nor [was] there evidence that any significant group would want to do so”,15 therefore the removal of Sukarno would have to be gradual rather than instantaneous. It was also decided by the US Embassy in Jakarta that General Suharto, who was already making a name for himself within the military, would be a suitable leader in this revolution because he was more anti-Communist and easier to swade. Despite not being “clearly typed as a ‘modernizer’, [American] support may help cast him in this mold”.16 Although this is not indicative of Suharto’s position regarding Sukarno, the content and origin of this account is valuable in demonstrating the influence Washington seemed to have over Indonesian attitudes.

Despite these efforts, it is important not to assume that the US’s involvement was always successful in propagating anti-Communist sentiment. In actuality, the investigations of historians Morrison and Conboy in 1999 revealed that many Indonesians were more interested in “economic independence” than helping America.17 However, without US involvement, there is potential the PKI may not have been blamed for masterminding the September 30th Movement. As such, a spotlight needs to be shone on Washington’s covert operations.

United States’ Exploitation of the Coup 

After the coup on the 1st of October, 1965, the US sought to use the opportunity they saw for Sukarno to be replaced by Suharto and the Indonesian Army. Following the coup, the American Embassy in Jakarta observed the Army as initially cautious towards taking power. By the 4th of October, the Army was yet to “rea[ch] a decision on whether to maintain its drive for complete victory over the PKI”.18 With little regard for the Army’s apprehensions, Washington moved swiftly, immediately blaming the PKI for the coup without sound evidence. Australian historian Karim Najjarine, writing in 2004, argues that the US’s blaming of the PKI was “determine[d] more by a combination of ideological prejudice and suspicion … than on concrete evidence”.19

A 1965 American Embassy telegram strongly supports Najjarin’s conclusion, as it states that journalists were observing PKI members being “thoroughly confused and claiming lack of any foreknowledge of [the] September 30th Movement”.20 This shows the inconsistency of the knowledge of the situation in Indonesia at the time, ultimately highlighting the difference between the US’s public and covert policymaking stance. However, America’s declaration of blame on the PKI served as vital encouragement to the Army, which they followed with offers to “shape developments to [US] advantage” and “spread the story of the PKI’s guilt, treachery, and brutality”.21

Therefore, although the United States did not instigate the coup, it and, more specifically, the CIA was a key factor in shaping the results of the September 30th Movement’s coup through their involvement in the 1950s and 1960s. The United States bolstered the Indonesian Army, which  was the trigger that ultimately led to thousands of unfortunate, innocent deaths.

Monique Westcott
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  1. “The Shadow Play (CIA Roles in Indonesia Killings of 1965-1966),” Youtube, posted by Aishaa Fitriani on November 6, 2014. Accessed 20 March 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=632&v=lTBCHvumJvA&feature=emb_logo.
  2.  Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World (New York, Pantheon, 1998), 181.
  3. Helen-Louise Hunter, Sukarno and the Indonesian Coup: The Untold Story (United States of America: Praeger Security International, 2007).
  4. John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 176–201.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958. (Marland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 12.
  7.  Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, 200.
  8. Conboy, Feet to the Fire, 32.
  9. Jaechun Kim, “U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences,” Journal of International and Area Studies 9, no.2 (2002): 63–85. www.jstor.org/stable/43107065.
  10. Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, 179.
  11. Kim, US Covert Action, 70
  12. Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, 180.
  13. Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967” (Pacific Affairs 58, no.2, 1985): 246. doi:10.2307/2758262.
  14. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 001786 [DOS Memo for President of July 17, 1964].
  15. “Special Report on Indonesia” (United States: National Security Council, January 1959), as cited in Roosa, Pretext of Mass Murder, 181.
  16. Letter, Norman Hannah to Marshall Green, 23 October 1957, National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4107018-Document-8-Letter-from-Norman-Hannah-CINCPAC-to.  Accessed 18 March 2022.
  17. Letter, Norman Hannah to Marshall Green, 23 October 1957, National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4107018-Document-8-Letter-from-Norman-Hannah-CINCPAC-to. Accessed 18 March 2022.
  18. Indonesia Working Group Situation Report (4 October 1965), as cited in Roosa, Pretext of Mass Murder, 194.
  19. Karim Najjarine, “Australian Perceptions of PKI Involvement in the 1965 Attempted Coup in Indonesia,” AQ: Australian Quarterly 76, no. 5 (2004): 26-40.
  20. Telegram 1516 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State (November 20, 1965), as cited in “The Shadow Play”.
  21. US Embassy in Jakarta to Department of State, (United States: Department of State, 5 October 1965), as cited in Roosa, Pretext of Mass Murder, 194.