Japan’s 99th prime minister Yoshihide Suga was quickly hailed as Shinzo Abe’s successor in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), after the former prime minister announced his decision to step down almost two months ago on the 28th of August 2020. Many have begun to speculate this new change– analysing Suga’s policies and what this will mean for Japan in the next few years.
Who is Yoshihide Suga?
As a close ally of the former prime minister for almost 8 years, Suga was tasked with being the Abe government’s Chief Cabinet Secretary—playing a behind-the-scenes role as the second most senior position in the government. Now, he is tasked with dealing with the country’s COVID19 response and its biggest economic slump on record.
Mr Suga’s humble beginnings demonstrates the uniqueness that he brings to government, but also leaves him vulnerable to party politics. As his background is from rural Japan, this makes him different to many upper-class men in bureaucracy. It also makes him the first factionless leader in the LDP since its founding in 1955. As Columbia University Gerald Curtis summarises: ‘His passion is on the domestic side’. His belief in economic revival as a core tenant in Japan’s prosperity, as opposed to Abe’s nationalist goals of reinstating Japan as world leader akin to its imperialist days, will further influence decisions as he takes a pragmatic stance on domestic policies, promising continuity and stability.
Japan’s new foreign policy?
Suga’s administration has indicated its general adherence to Abe’s foreign policy initiatives. However, unlike more hard-line stances taken by Abe, Suga’s prioritisation for stability may translate across into foreign relations. The administration has already indicated openness to fostering further collaboration with Beijing, which may come as a disappointment to the US and Australia, who had counted on Abe’s interest in defence innovation to further balance security dynamics with China.
The younger brother of Mr Abe, Nobuo Kishi’s appointment as the new defence minister, has been seen as a lacklustre move by many critics, a choice motivated by faction politics rather than defence experience. As such, this may largely indicate the passivity that the new Japanese cabinet will bring to defence issues. However, it is important to note Kishi’s role in promoting the Japanese-Taiwan relationship back in 2015, as well as shared hard line stances with Mr Abe, as he publicly supported the necessity for strike capabilities against North Korea and China.
Similarities to Abe
Interestingly, Suga’s reselection of more than half of his cabinet as they were under the last administration, demonstrates the new prime minister’s endeavours in playing by Abe’s policy playbook. Given the new Prime Ministers lack of experience in foreign policy, many envision a more laissez-faire (hands-off) approach, allowing respective ministers to take the reigns and sustain the key foreign ties achieved previously. In fact, Suga himself had admitted to the difficulties in replicating Abe’s ‘leadership diplomacy’, rather stating that he would find his own ‘diplomatic stance…while seeking assistance from the Foreign ministry’. Given the close relationship between the current and former prime ministers, it is important to restate that any foreign policy direction will likely be taken under the guidance of Mr Abe.
Indeed, the reinstatement of Motegi Toshimitsu as Foreign Minister, who played a vital part in the new trade pact with the US in 2019, and hailed as the ‘Trump whisperer’ by Nikkei Newspaper, indicates Tokyo’s plans at maintaining the security and economic partnerships it had formed with its American ally. This is a welcoming sight for Australia, who aims to maintain close ties with the 3rd biggest economy, whilst solving its own security tensions in the Indo Pacific. The ‘Quad’ forum held in Tokyo on October 6, between the respective foreign ministers of US, Japan, Australia and India, will see the nations ‘who share the same ambitions…exchange views over various [regional] challenges’, and an important step for Tokyo as it continues to balance the US-Sino relationship.
On the other hand, there is general scepticism towards hopes for improved relations with South Korea. In recent years, negotiations on key wartime issues have been notoriously bad between the two countries, and exacerbated by Abe’s administrations nationalist stance.
As Kim Tong Hyung expresses, ‘mutual resentment runs deep and goes beyond individual politicians’. As such, whilst prime minister Suga himself may be open to diplomatic negotiation, it is difficult to see political conflicts resolved anytime soon.
Overall, it is likely that the Suga administration represents a relative continuity of previous policies under Abe, whilst prioritising economic stability. With talks of the upcoming general election in October 2021, it is unclear whether Mr Suga will be able to hold onto his role, given factionless vulnerability and neutral popularity with the public. If voted out, japan may once again find itself overseeing a rapid turnover of prime ministers, akin to the days before Abe.
Regardless, given the pressing nature of the pandemic and economic reform, domestic issues will take precedence, and it is unlikely that any Japanese government will look outwards to foreign endeavours for the time being.
