BY HAMAH HOSEN-
Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, an archipelago in the South Pacific voted for a second chance at independence. On October 4th, New Caledonia’s status as a French overseas territory was once again being challenged after its narrow fail vote in 2018. The choice of independence would not have just lead to a change in powers to the territory and the end of French subsidies but it also had the potential to impact the pacific region through shifts in regional influence. Yet despite a new year, the results are the same: Divisive identities; France’s regional influence; and economic guarantees for New Caledonia.
The attempts at independence by New Caledonia stems from the Nouméa Accord, a signed agreement between the French Republic and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia (FLNKS) after a period of major civil unrest in 1998. The Accord entitles New Caledonia to a maximum of three independence referendums, and the 2020 referendum was only the second chance at independence.
The results of the 2020 referendum has showed that the idea of independence remains to be a divisive topic in New Caledonia. With a voter turnout of 85.6%, the referendum results had 53.26% of the votes to remain French. These results are similar to the referendum vote in 2018, with an 81% voter turnout and 56.7% voting to remain a part of France. Although Emmanuel Macron commented that the results are “a sign of confidence in the republic”, the numbers suggest otherwise.
What can be taken from these results is not just that New Caledonia is staying French but rather similar to 2018, it also reveals an ethnic divide and the ongoing social and economic fault lines. The pro-independence movement is largely made up of indigenous people of New Caledonia, the Kanaks, and those remaining to stay French largely have a European background. The results also reflected the voting patterns from the 2019 provincial elections, where the South opposed independence and the North favoured independence.
Despite the numerical results, the sentiments and attitudes post-referendum can remain and influence the governance of New Caledonia even after the ‘no’ vote. Even during the lead up to the 2020 referendum FLNK leaders and Les Loyalistes Coalition, the pro-France parties, were using COVID-19 to further their campaigns. For example, FLNK leaders were directly critical of France, especially in regards to their “one-size-fits-all pandemic management” in New Caledonia. Additionally, loyalists used this time to push for an early vote and to use the French ‘tricolours’ – the colours on the flag, in their campaign. It would be premature to think that these tactics and the reasoning’s behind it will go away post-referendum. It would also be bold to assume that divisive attitudes will falter especially since the possibility of a third referendum looms in the future.
The results of the referendum have also secured the strategic influence of France, and more broadly the West, in the pacific region. A vote for independence would have struck France’s commitments to the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in their recent white paper. The report noted that New Caledonia allowed France to be anchored in the region and contributed to France’s regional influence. In particular, France’s military presence in New Caledonia have been noted as important for their ability to exercise its freedom of navigation rights and also to strengthen their alliances and initiatives such as those of disaster relief and surveillance. However, France’s presence in the region provides some with a sigh of relief to counter China’s rise in the region. As with their neighbours, local governments in New Caledonia and French Polynesia have sought closer links with China. Australia remained neutral during the referendum vote, but there was a sense of fear that France would slowly withdraw from the Pacific and deprive Australia of a key ally in the region if independence was to occur.
Economically, the results have also guaranteed New Caledonians with continued support from France. A key deciding matter for the referendum was the uncertainty regarding France’s support for the region if independence was to occur. New Caledonia has a large degree of autonomy but still relies on France for matters such as defence and education, and they are still provided economic subsidies from France. According to Al Jazeera, these subsidies provides $1.5bn in financial support annually. Given that the referendum occurred during COVID-19, where it has been projected that it will have negative economic consequences internationally, it seems reasonable that economic considerations played into the vote.
Despite all these results, New Caledonians have one more chance to vote for independence in 2022 if requested by a third of the local assembly. It will be uncertain whether results will differ only after 2 years. However, the divisions in New Caledonia, the promises of France’s regional influence and economic guarantees for New Caledonia will ultimately be on close watch. The attitudes, sentiments and concerns held in the 2020 referendum will without a doubt continue to exist into the next referendum. Once again, it will remain important that France remains to manage the agreements of the Noumea Accords while simultaneously respecting the positions of loyalists, pro-independents, and France itself. Otherwise, the concerns from this year’s referendum will follow through.
