The highs are numerous and growing. Both nations are parties to a plethora of bilateral agreements including the Lombok Treaty (2006), the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2018) and the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2019). Australia has committed significant diplomatic resources to Indonesia, with its network extending to Jakarta, Bali, Surabaya and Makassar. Undoubtedly, the nations ‘enjoy an extensive framework of cooperation spanning political, economic, security, development, education and people-to-people ties’.[1]
However the lows are equally numerous and significant. In recent years, angry diplomatic rows have been sparked by events such as the Bali Bombings, state-sponsored violence in Timor Leste and West Papua, the execution of Bali Nine drug smugglers Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan, the growth of fundamentalist forms of Islam, the phone tapping of Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Australia’s ‘Stop The Boats’ policy of asylum-seeker boat turn-backs.
Yet the relationship has not always been so complicated. Laying at the root of the Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relationship is a tale of an unlikely friendship: a fledgeling nation backed by a vocal advocate.
Independence! Freedom! Merdeka!
The tale begins with Indonesia’s declaration of independence. Today is Hari Kemerdekaan (Independence Day). Spanning across the diverse archipelago that is Indonesia, streets and alleys are awash with red and white flags to celebrate the nation’s 75th birthday. On 17 August 1945, just two days following the end of World War II, Indonesia proclaimed independence from Dutch colonial rule. However, it was not until 27 December 1949 that the Netherlands (begrudgingly) agreed to transfer sovereignty. As the nascent Republic fought fierce Dutch efforts to reassert colonial power during the intervening period, it was Australia who leant crucial assistance and drove the international community’s eventual support for the Indonesian nationalist cause. Australia’s role was so prominent that Indonesia’s foreign minister, Dr Subandrio, would later describe Australia as the ‘midwife’ of the Indonesian Republic.[2]
Black bans (‘Armada hitam’)
The first instance of Australian support came from a somewhat unlikely source – the Australian union movement. On 23 September 1945, having heard of Indonesia’s proclamation of independence, Indonesian crew members of four Dutch ships berthed in Sydney held a sit-down strike. They (rightly) feared that the arms and other material carried by the ships was intended to suppress the independence movement and accordingly lobbied the Australian government and trade unions to show their support. Some 31 Australian trade unions, including the Waterside Workers’ Federation and the Seamen’s Union took up the cause by imposing black bans on Dutch vessels and cargo, and refusing to undertake repairs to Dutch boats.[3] The instructions issued by the Trades and Labor Council to unionists were stark:[4]
“Dutch soldiers and officers should not get transport. No Dutch munitions should be touched. Repairs on Dutch ships, etc., must not be done. Dutch ships must not get coal. Tugs must not be made available to Dutch skips. Food, stores, etc., must not be provided to Dutch ships, offices, canteens or personnel. Dutch officers and seamen should not be taken to and from ships. In fact, everything Dutch is black.”
Ultimately black bans were placed on 559 Dutch ships carrying materials that were intended to supply the Dutch effort.[5] The boycott action in Australia drove a broader international boycott: four Asian trade unions joined the immobilisations and similar boycotts were imposed.[6] As Lockwood argues, the ‘schedule-wrecking’ delays gave the nascent Indonesian government sufficient time to consolidate its administrative capacity and therefore better weather the ‘carnage and disorder’ that was subsequently initiated by the Dutch.[7]
Early diplomatic recognition and relations
Australia was one of the first countries to formally recognise the Indonesian Republic and establish diplomatic ties. Following the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947 – in which the Dutch recognised the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java, Madura and Sumatra – the Australian Department of External Affairs quickly directed its efforts towards establishing an Australian-Indonesian commercial and diplomatic relationship. These efforts extended to negotiating trading contracts and offering the interim Indonesian government advice and economic assistance in the fields of trade, finance, communications and economic rehabilitation and development.[8] On 9 July 1947, Australia formally announced its recognition of the de facto status of the Indonesian Republic.
These developments were highly significant. They afforded the nascent Republic quasi-state status, despite its lack of absolute sovereignty. They accelerated the governance and diplomatic capabilities of the Indonesian leadership. They also portrayed the Dutch as behaving out-of-line when it subsequently launched two offensive military campaigns. This proved crucial in the ongoing efforts by the Indonesian nationalist leadership to establish broader international support and obtain state recognition.
Achievement of a diplomatic solution
Despite the black bans and Australia’s early diplomatic outreach, the Dutch initiated an aggressive campaign of violence and oppression that ultimately lasted until May 1949. While this was interspersed with periods of negotiation, it remained evident that the Dutch were unwilling to relinquish control of their former colony (or at least not without a fight).
Between 1946 and 1947, Australian utilised its position as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to bring the situation in Indonesia to the attention of the international community.
On 20 July 1947, the Netherlands abandoned its negotiating position and launched a carefully planned military offensive against the Republic, known today as the First Dutch Military Action (‘Operation Product’). Ten days later on 30 July 1947, Australia referred the conflict to the UN Security Council as a breach of peace under Article 39 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter.[9] This was the first time that an Article 39 referral had been brought to the UN.
The referral spurred a flurry of Security Council resolutions. Under resolution 27, Australia facilitated the participation of a representative from the Indonesian Republic in Security Council discussions.[10] Australia successfully co-sponsored resolution 30, which improved diplomatic communication on the situation within Indonesia.[11] Then under resolution 31, the Security Council established the Good Offices Committee which comprised of three representatives: a Dutch nominee, an Indonesian nominee and a third appointed by the nominees themselves.[12] In recognition of its neighbour’s favourable advocacy, Indonesia invited Australia to be its nominee.[13] The Good Offices Committee subsequently negotiated the Renville Agreement (17 January 1948) which facilitated a ceasefire (albeit temporarily).
Australia was an important actor in ensuring that Indonesia and the Netherlands continued down the diplomatic path towards a solution. Australia defended the involvement of Indonesian representatives in Security Council discussions.[14] Australia opposed a Belgian move to have the question of the Security Council’s competence over the Indonesian situation referred to the International Court of Justice, arguing that the Court would be slow in yielding an opinion and would not meet the urgent political situation.[15] Australia also opposed a British suggestion that the Good Offices Committee should establish a line of demarcation between the opposing forces because this would take too long to organise and would injure the Republic’s cause.[16]
From January 1948, Australia ceased to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Nevertheless, Australia continued to play an active role as an interested party in Security Council discussions and through the ongoing work of the Good Offices Committee. Australian diplomatic officials worked to ensure that the reports of the Committee were favourable to Indonesia (rather than pro-Netherlands).[17] In December 1948, Australia openly denounced the Second Dutch Military Action (‘Operation Kraai’),[18] declaring ‘we thus have the first clear-cut deliberate violation of the Charter by a [United Nations] Member’.[19] Additionally, it was Australian diplomat, Tom Critchley, who assisted the Dutch and Republican delegations to reach the Roem-Van Roijen Agreement (7 May 1949) which facilitated the cessation of Dutch armed hostilities, the restoration of the Republican Government to Yogyakarta and the resumption of negotiations for a political settlement.[20]
These efforts culminated Indonesia’s attainment of sovereign statehood. On 27 December 1949, following negotiations at the Dutch-Indonesian Roundtable Conference (23 August – 2 November 1949), the Netherlands transferred political sovereignty to Indonesia. Australia and India subsequently co-sponsored Indonesia’s UN membership, the modern indication of sovereign statehood.[21]
Concluding remarks
Today, a more nationalistic historical narrative takes credence in Indonesia – one where Indonesia’s independence from colonialism was ‘self-delivered’ through impassioned resistance during an, at times, bloody revolution.[22] Likewise, most Australians would be unacquainted with Australia’s ardent support for our northern neighbour – support which was undoubtedly crucial in facilitating Indonesia’s attainment of independence.
This is a shame. The early Indonesia-Australia relationship is a tale of diplomacy at its finest. It is one from which contemporary Australian and Indonesian leaders should endeavour to draw inspiration.
References
[1] “Indonesia,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/indonesia-country-brief.
[2] Prime Minister Robert Menzies referred to Dr Subandrio’s reported statement that the Chifley Government was the “midwife” of the Republic in 1959. See Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 30, no. 2, (February 1959), 86.
[3] “Independence,” UNSW School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019, https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/east-timor/english/historical-context/independence.
[4] Trades and Labor Council quoted in Stephen Gapps, “The ships that didn’t sail: Australian support for Indonesian Independence,” Signals 112 (September-November 2015): 10.
[5] Ibid.
[6] These were the Chinese Seamen’s Union in Australia; the Indonesian Seamen’s Union in Australia; the Indian Seamen’s Union in Australia; and the Malayan Merchant Navy Association.
[7] Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada: Australia and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1942-49 (Sydney: Australasian Book Society, 1982
[8] WJ. Hudson, ‘Australia and Indonesian Independence,’ Journal of Southeast Asian History 8, no. 2 (1967), 232.
[9] United Nations Security Council, Letter from the acting representative of Australia on the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/449 (30 July 1947).
[10] United Nations Security Council resolution 27, S/RES/27 (1 August 1947).
[11] United Nations Security Council resolution 30, S/RES/30 (25 August 1947).
[12] United Nations Security Council resolution 31, S/RES/31 (25 August 1947).
[13] Australia sat on this Committee as the Indonesian nominee, together with the Dutch nominee, Belgium, and the United States.
[14] Security Council Official Records, 2nd Yr., 181st Mtg., 12 August 1947, p 1930.
[15] Security Council Official Records, 2nd Yr., 195th Mtg., 26 August, pp 2216-7.
[16] Hudson, ‘Australia and Indonesian Independence,’ 233.
[17] Ibid, 233.
[18] Operation Kraai was a Dutch military offensive which enabled the capture of the Indonesian Republic’s temporary capital, Yogyakarta, and the seizure of key Indonesian leaders. This was followed with guerrilla warfare, in violation of the Renville Agreement.
[19] Quoted in Hudson, ‘Australia and Indonesian Independence,’ 230.
[20] Alexander Downer, “Australia & Indonesia’s Independence: The Transfer Of Sovereignty: Documents 1949,” speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the launch of Australia & Indonesia’s Independence: The Transfer Of Sovereignty: Documents 1949, Borobudur Hotel, Jakarta, 9 July 1998.
[21] United Nations General Assembly resolution 491(V), A/RES/491(V) (28 September 1950); United Nations Security Council resolution 86, S/RES/86 (26 September 1950).
[22] Johannes Nugroho, ‘Lest We Forget: Australia’s Role in Indonesian Independence,’ Jakarta Globe (Jakarta) 10 August 2015, https://jakartaglobe.id/context/johannes-nugroho-lest-forget-australias-role-indonesian-independence/.
