Last year, the War in Afghanistan became the longest war the United States had participated in. In 2020, there still seems to be no clear end in sight for the conflict, 19 years in.
The Negotiations Thus Far:
Sporadic peace-making efforts have occurred since the start of the war, but began to intensify in 2018 between the Taliban, the country’s main insurgent group, the Afghani government, and the United States. On February 29 this year, the US and the Taliban signed a landmark agreement in Doha. The agreement dictated the withdrawal of all foreign troops by the second quarter of 2021. The agreement will only go ahead in return for peaceful guarantees from the Taliban, along with a permanent cease-fire and power-sharing agreement with the government.
From the start, the agreement was problematic. For one, the Afghan government, led by President Ashraf Ghani, was not included in negotiations. This meant that some of the conditions, and dates by which they should be performed, were written without the approval of the government. A key part of the agreement is a ‘prisoner swap’ between the government and the Taliban. The Afghan government is meant to release up to 5,000 Taliban members, who in turn are meant to release up to 1,000 Afghan security personnel. Per the agreement, a portion of these prisoners were meant to be released by March 10. On March 1, President Ghani rejected this due date, stating that the release of prisoners was solely ‘the authority of the government of Afghanistan’, not anyone else’s.
Negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government were meant to begin on March 10, after the set number of prisoners had been released. After the government’s rejection, this never occurred.
Since then, negotiations have stopped and started sporadically, with both sides refusing to give ground on key demands. Attempts at talks have been rejected by the Taliban for not being ‘constituted in accordance’ with their demands. After a week of discussions held in Kabul in early April, the Taliban departed, describing the talks as ‘fruitless’. Tensions were high, with the Afghan government blaming the Taliban for deliberately targeting civilian centres and killing women and children.
Escalating Violence:
A key source of tension has been the Taliban’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire during negotiations.
Shortly after Ghani’s initial rejection of the due date for the prisoner release, the Taliban resumed its attacks. On the 4th of March, the US also renewed its airstrikes, targeting bases in the country’s south. Since then, insurgent attacks against Afghan forces have soared. Between March 1 and 15 April, over 4,500 attacks occurred, an increase of over 70% compared to the same period in 2019.
The fighting has not stopped since then. On 22 June, Afghan personnel recorded their ‘bloodiest week’ ever across the entire 19-year war with 291 military members being killed. Additionally, at least 42 civilians were killed the same week, and over 60 women and children were kidnapped.
For its part, the Taliban has dismissed the possibility of a ceasefire as ‘illogical’, stating that fighting will continue until solutions are agreed upon.
The Prisoner Exchange:
Arguably the main problem regarding negotiations thus far have been the prisoner exchange. Both sides seem to be willing to comply with the idea of a prisoner swap, at least. It is in the details that negotiation is getting bogged down. Part of the delay has been the government wanting strict control over which Taliban prisoners are released. The Taliban has provided a list of specific members who they want to be released, stating that they will only proceed with negotiations once the prisoner release ‘is completed’. The government protested this, stating that many of the members the Taliban wish to be released are high-ranking members who committed serious crimes. They also called for a guarantee from the Taliban to not have any of the released prisoners return to fighting. Afghan officials further dispute the types of prisoners being released by the Taliban. They had specifically asked for military personnel and say that about half of those being released are civilians.
Despite these major hurdles, there has been progress. On July 29, a 3-day ceasefire centred around the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha was agreed upon. During the announcement, President Ghani restated the government’s commitment to complete the release Taliban prisoners, as well as a imminent start to negotiations in as little as ‘a week’s time’. Thus far, around 4,400 Taliban have been released. In turn, around 860 men have been released by the Taliban, though obvious disputes remain around which type of personnel have been released.
The Prospect of Peace:
It is necessary to remember that the prisoner swap is merely the first step to negotiations, and real, difficult discussion on the country’s future still lies ahead.
In May 2020, a power-sharing deal was signed between President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, his chief political rival. Abdullah was Ghani’s chief opponent in the 2019 elections, which Ghani won. The results were heavily disputed as fraudulent, however, and as a compromise, Ghani and Abdullah now share power. Crucially, Abdullah was also appointed head of negotiations with the Taliban. Extremely contentious issues relating to what type of country Afghanistan will become in the future will need to be decided. These include topics such as women’s rights, the constitution and the role of religion in state. The February agreement between the US and Taliban was four pages long and contained no information on any of these topics, making the current government’s role all the more complex. Abdullah himself stated that on ‘certain issues’, the government and Taliban are far apart, and that coming to an agreement will be difficult.
The level to which should be compromised is itself controversial. In Kabul where the government is based, rhetoric is currently firm on the need to stay a democratic republic, albeit a flawed one. The Taliban is committed to a country under Islamic law. The recent bloodshed has caused a divide in this opinion, however. The northern province of Takhar has been devastated by recent combat, being described as a ‘slaughterhouse’. This brutality is not limited to soldiers. From January to June this year, at least 1,282 civilians have been killed, including over 300 children. ‘Peace should come at any cost’ was the statement made by Mir Ahmad Qasim, a local Takhar lawmaker, regardless of the compromises made.
Whatever happens, it has the ability to drastically affect the complete withdrawal of US troops. Per the February deal, by June 18 the US had reduced its Afghan troop numbers to 8,600. The US House Armed Services Committee voted in favour of restricting further withdrawal until it can be ascertained that American interests in the country will not be compromised. Should negotiations stall or fall apart, the US faces the daunting prospect of recommitting troops, which would very likely drag the already protracted conflict into its third decade.
