In the midst of a pandemic, the Middle East’s largest proxy war has continued to escalate. A new player has emerged on the scene, threatening further instability and diplomatic strain. Somewhat lost due to other current events, Turkey began its military intervention in Libya at the start of the year.
Since the fall of ISIL and the National Salvation Government, control over Libya has been contested by two main factions. These are the House of Representatives and the Government of National Accord.
The HofR is headed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and is based primarily in Tobruk in the country’s east. Haftar is also the commander of the Libyan National Army. His militarised, personality-based rule has drawn comparison to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. It makes sense seeing as Haftar was once part of Gaddafi’s inner circle and had helped him seize power in 1969 before military failures led to Gaddafi disowning him. The GNA is led by Fayez al-Sarraj and is based in the capital city of Tripoli, along the western shore.
The conflict has many foreign powers watching keenly. The House of Representatives has received support from actors as varied as Russia, the United Arab Emirates and France. Though somewhat disparate in their end goals, all view Haftar as the better solution for both the country and their own political gains.
The Government of National Accord is the government officially supported by the United Nations and in turn the United States and the United Kingdom. Formed by a UN agreement in 2015 as the first step to a unified Libyan government, they immediately met resistance from Haftar’s faction.
Amidst this complicated web, Turkey entered the fray. On 2 January, the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of troops to Libya. On 16 January, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan officially announced the beginning of Turkish deployment.
The reasoning for the intervention is multifaceted. Erdogan claims that Turkey wishes to ‘support the legitimate government’ and ‘avoid a humanitarian tragedy’. However, economic gains appear to have been a driving force behind the deployment. On 27 November 2019, Turkey and Libya signed a maritime deal which seeks to create a shared exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean. If successful, it will span from eastern Libya to the southern Turkish coast.
In the past decade, the eastern Mediterranean has proven to be rich in natural oil and gas deposits. This deal would appear to be Turkey staking a claim to part of these resources. The move has also suddenly complicated EastMed. The Eastern Mediterranean pipeline is a hypothetical natural gas pipeline currently being planned by Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. If implemented, it will span from the Israeli coast to Cyprus to Greece, and possibly all the way to Italy. The Turkish-Libyan economic zone will cut directly into the path of the planned EastMed pipeline between Greece and Cyprus. This is the latest in a decades-long Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey regarding maritime territory. According to Greece, the exclusive economic zone will cut into its claimed maritime territory, which Turkey also claims as its own.
This assertive move suggests that Turkey will not be left out of any future excavation of resources in the eastern Mediterranean. The move is also likely fuelled by Turkey not wanting to lose its status as the main transit point for Russian natural gas heading to Europe, which provides it some economic leverage over other nations. Backing the GNA in Libya is the only way this energy deal will be honoured.
The other possible key motivation for Turkish intervention lies with its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist organisation. Initially gaining widespread support during the Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt, the group lost most of its gains soon after. It is currently designated a terrorist organisation in Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These same nations, along with France, also back Haftar. Turkey and Qatar currently stand as the Brotherhood’s primary state backers.
Erdogan previously supported anti-Assad rebels affiliated with the organisation in Syria. Currently, the Libyan branch of the Brotherhood supports the GNA. Ensuring a GNA victory in Libya would expand Turkish influence whilst simultaneously hampering Haftar-aligned states.
Unsurprisingly, Haftar-affiliated nations strongly condemned the deployment. The Saudi government called the move an ‘escalation’ and a violation of UN Security Council decisions. Egypt has particularly strongly criticised the move. A state-run newspaper, al-Ahram, labelled it ‘an attempt… to project… power in regions that once belonged to the former Ottoman Empire’. Egypt’s worry seems particularly pertinent since the military overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Morsi’s party, though nominally independent, had strong links with the Muslim Brotherhood. Since his overthrow, Egypt has designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation and engaged in the systematic repression of its followers. Egypt seems worried that allowing a party with ties to the Brotherhood to come to power in Libya would allow its resurgence within its own borders. Turkey, for its part, seems to wish this to be the case.
Despite broad support for the GNA, Western reaction to the intervention has also been largely negative. Josep Borrell, the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy all condemned Turkey’s plans for deployment back in January. In a joint statement, the ministers stated that ‘outside interference’ would only make the crisis worse. They warned that ‘foreign military assistance’ would provide countries such as Turkey ‘undue influence’ on Libyan decisions. Similar thoughts about the possible exacerbation of the conflict were echoed by the White House.
All reasoning and reactions aside, the current consensus is that the intervention has tipped the odds in the GNA’s favour. Prior to Turkish deployment, the GNA was beleaguered and largely trapped within the capital city of Tripoli. Though they had stalemated before, Haftar’s forces had begun a renewed push to take the city late last year. Now, Turkey’s military backing has abruptly changed things. A commentary released by the European Council on Foreign Relations on 20 May titled ‘It’s Turkey’s Libya now’ showcase the dramatic reversal in fortune.
With Turkish tactics and drones, GNA forces have largely broken the siege on Tripoli and swept out along the coast towards Tunisia. Multiple of Haftar’s western strongholds have fallen. As of June 1, the next major battle appears to be for the town of Tarhuna, some 60-70km south-east of Tripoli. It is Haftar’s key western stronghold, and its loss would be a major setback. These developments have Haftar and his army on the defensive. What comes next is anyone’s guess.
The UN envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, fears that further escalation and foreign interference could turn Libya into a ‘pure proxy war’. Up until now, the UAE has provided drone support to Haftar’s men. Any further support, such as fighter jets, would mark a dramatic escalation of the conflict that is unlikely to go unreciprocated by Turkey.
Despite supporting opposite sides, Russo-Turkish relations seem to be at the forefront of determining Libya’s near-future. A telephone call between Sergei Lavrov and Mevlut Cavusogly, Russia and Turkey’s respective foreign ministers, occurred in late May. Afterwards, the countries made a joint call for a cease-fire, and for UN-led negotiations to reopen. A similar call had been made in January, but Haftar ignored it, likely believing that Tripoli’s fall was imminent.
With the tide now shifting, these negotiations seem like more of an option again. On May 26, the US military’s Africa Command accused Russia of deploying over a dozen MiG-29 fighter jets to Libya. Rather than a sign of imminent violent escalation, experts say the planes are instead Russia strengthening its negotiating position and slowing further Turkish gains.
Domestic support for Haftar seems to be diminishing. In a leaked video, Aguila Saleh, speaker for Haftar’s House of Representatives, announced a plan of his own for Libya which directly contradicts that of Haftar. In the same video, Saleh stated that his plan had the support of Egypt and Russia.
The complexity of the situation suggests a quick end to the conflict is unlikely to occur. Rather, Turkey may have dragged itself into another Syria-style quagmire. The rise of Aguila Selah adds another player who may bring their own demands to any future negotiation and could become powerful should Haftar’s allies switch their support to him. Russia clearly refuses to be left out of discussions. And Libya’s eastern coast that Turkey desires for its exclusive economic zone is still firmly in opposition control. As long as a divided coast remains, the agreement between the GNA and Turkey will not be fulfilled. To make matters worse, in late May an anti-Turkish alliance consisting of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE and France was formed. In a joint statement, the alliance condemned ‘illegal’ Turkish drilling in the exclusive economic zone.
How Western powers will proceed, or if they will proceed at all, is unclear. In March, Ghassan Salamé, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, unexpectedly resigned due to his frustrations with a lack of progress on peace talks.
In a video recorded in late May, Haftar’s air force chief stated that all ‘Turkish positions and interests’ are legitimate targets for strikes. The conflict has already seen an increase in ‘indiscriminate shelling’ on civilian areas in Tripoli. With all the uncertainties at play, the only certainty seems to be that more innocents will die before it is all over.
