Amidst the global chaos of a possible pandemic, a historic event occurred on the 29th of February in Doha. The United States and the Taliban officially signed a peace deal; paving the way for the withdrawal of coalition troops after 18 years of conflict in Afghanistan. But important questions remain about the nature of the peace achieved and the future relationship between the Taliban and the internationally recognised Afghan government.
Conflict in Afghanistan – The Forever War
The nation and people of Afghanistan have been trapped in periods of conflict for at least the last 40 years; tracing the first significant spark of violence back to the 1979-1989 USSR invasion and occupation.
By 2001, central and provisional governments had come under the control of the Taliban, at the time a hard-line Sunni political group who had risen to power seven years earlier after toppling the Mujahedeen regime with the promise of stamping out rampant corruption.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and with intelligence that the Taliban were hiding Osama Bin Laden and aiding Al-Qaeda, the US and it’s primary coalition partner, the UK, invaded. By November the Taliban had been removed and ceased to be a political power.
Over the next several years, coalition forces remained in Afghanistan with the strategic interest of rebuilding the country and aiding its democratic transition with the first ‘democratic’ elections taking place in October, 2004. At the same time the Taliban, who had retreated to the border regions and crossed into Pakistan, began a campaign of insurgency.
Efforts in Afghanistan took a significant hit following the US invasion of Iraq and repositioning of Coalition priorities. The new conflict zone syphoned resources and personal earmarked for Afghanistan and starved it of resources needed for stabilisation and rebuilding.
Over the next decade and a half, aided by governmental corruption and coming up against an inexperienced local security force, the Taliban carried out numerous attacks throughout Afghanistan and began incrementally retaking territory. The ‘surge’ under President Obama did little to abate the Taliban’s attacks and territorial gains.
2019 saw a peak in violence with over 10,000 civilian casualties. To date, there have been over 100,000 civilian casualties since the start of the war and insurgency. Over 3500 coalition troops have been killed in combat, and a 2019 analysis by Brown University found that the war as a whole has cost the US $975 billion; with the Taliban now controlling or contesting 70% of the administrative regions in Afghanistan.
Road to Peace
Peace talks between the US, Afghan government and the Taliban have occurred on and off since 2010/2011, following the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha (which itself caused controversy and stalled negotiations for several years).
Peace negotiations, in earnest, began in 2017 with the Afghan government offering favourable peace terms to the Taliban as well as a ceasefire agreement. Shortly afterwards, the Trump administration started appointing envoys to meet with the Taliban in Doha; the details of these meetings are mostly unknown but importantly did not include the Afghan government.
By late 2019, the US and the Taliban were close to signing a deal. However, a late escalation of violence, which resulted in the killing of a US soldier, stalled negotiations for several months. Peace talks resumed in December which has since led in the agreement signed at the end of February.
The Terms of Peace:
The official peace agreement (which you can read here) is a four-page document that lays out the terms of de-escalation and peace in three broad areas.
- Withdrawal and De-escalation:
Under the terms of the agreement, the US and coalition allies will reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan to 8,600 within the first 135 days following the signing of the deal; with all international forces to be withdrawn within 14 months. Additionally, the Afghan government and the Taliban will complete a prisoner exchange on the 10th of March, which is also earmarked to be the first day of Intra-Afghan negotiations between the government and the Taliban.
Additionally, the US commits to lifting sanctions on the Taliban throughout 2020, conditional on the progress of peace talks with the Afghan government.
- Counter-Terrorism
Harking back to the original reason for the US entering Afghanistan; Part 2 of the agreement broadly commits the Taliban to sever its ties with Al-Qaeda and preventing its resurgence in Taliban held territory.
- Future Relations:
Section three of the agreement sets out some broad (and vague) commitments to economic cooperation and development, which is contingent on the progress of peace talks with the Afghan government.
What the deal isn’t:
The agreement, as signed by both parties, is not a complete peace agreement. More akin to a withdrawal treaty, the agreement does not establish or allude to any form of power-sharing agreement. Nor those the agreement set out any concrete details on a permanent ceasefire beyond a 7-day promise to reduce violence following the singing of the agreement.
The Afghan government, who along with a multitude of ethnic/tribal groups who were not included in the negotiation phase due to their perceived illegitimacy by the Taliban, will now need to work out these details in the next phase of negotiations beginning in March. Other details, including which aspects of the new Afghan constitution and which reforms will be retained under any power-sharing agreement, will also need to be agreed upon in future negotiation rounds.
Troubled waters ahead:
International reaction to the agreement has ranged from cautiously optimistic to mixed. While both President Trump and Mick Pompeo celebrated the deal as a ‘success’ with the former noting, it was “time to bring our people home” in a press conference. Other areas of Washington have been more cautious. Democratic chair of foreign relations, Elliot Engel, voiced concern that the deal had been done “with little transparency”. At the same time, former Trump administration security advisor, John Bolton, fears that the agreement will “legitimise” the Taliban.
Beyond Washington, the deal has been met with greater scrutiny. Kate Clarke, a co-director at the Afghanistan Analysis Network has stated: “this is not yet a peace deal, it is a withdrawal deal”. Of concern to many international observes is the claims by the Taliban of their softened stance towards women and minorities from their pre-2001 counterparts. Many groups and activists, such as Marzia Rustami from Northern Afghanistan, fear that progress achieved under the coalition will stall or even recede should the rapid withdrawal of international forces lead to the Taliban regaining a position of prominent political power.
As of the writing of this article, on the 8th of March, there are significant signs that the nascent ‘peace deal’ is under strain. In the week since the deal was signed, more than 75 new Taliban attacks were carried out throughout Afghanistan; the US has also carried out their first set of airstrikes since the deal was signed, on the 4th of March. Within the Afghan government, with the 10th of March approaching, there is confusion as to whether a prisoner transfer should precede the initiation of peace talks or vice-versa.
The peace/withdrawal agreement signed by both the US and the Taliban is significant in that for the first time, it provides a possible route for the departure of international forces and an end to the US’s longest war. However, with its reliance on unpredictable future outcomes, only time will tell if this first step will be a crowning achievement of the Trump administration and a turning point for the region or just another footnote in the history of this ancient land.
