April 11th, 2019 is another significant date the citizens of Sudan will add to their history. “Just fall, that is all” were the chants that echoed outside the residence of the now former President Omar al-Bashir whose thirty-year regime was toppled Thursday after months of public protests and dissent that started with the price of bread. Defence Minister, Ahmed Awad Ibu Auf announced the President’s ousting on state television before declaring a three-month state of emergency and two year “transitional period” before staging elections – a process, the former Vice President said will oversee as provisional leader. However, the following day he too was ousted and has been replaced by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Abdulrahman much to the content of demonstrators who view the latter as having a “cleaner” record of conduct compared to the former and other al-Bashir allies. Furthermore, the military declared that al-Bashir will not be handed over to the Hague to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity over the conflict in Darfur but instead choose to act and hold him “accountable” themselves. In the aftermath of these developments, there requires an extensive degree of reflection for the jubilance felt by the Sudanese is momentary compared to the rather daunting two-year transitional period as forecast by the upper echelons of politics. The current situation in Sudan goes beyond the price of bread and fuel for this issue was merely a catalyst for a far greater sense of societal unrest that goes back decades.
Sudan is not a nation that makes the nightly news or print as regularly as one would expect unless it’s a story relating to the direst of humanity like the Darfur crisis or a dramatic change in leadership like the one occurring Thursday. Sudan is Africa’s third largest nation by land mass and with significant reserves in oil which attracts much investment from Asia and the Middle East and its proximity, as well as diplomatic ties, to the Arab world, Sudan has the potential to be an influential player in the global arena. To understand this significance, one needs to be acquainted with history especially in relation to the phenomenon of the coup d’état in Africa. The following should be considered a case as to why the World should be informed of Sudan – both past and present. The nation’s case is complex as its political character and development, needs to be considered in the context of political violence and crisis that have defined the post-colonial condition, as crucial and constitutive rather than strictly “civil” or “internal” (Ayers 2012: 261). The “nation’s history” is an accumulation of ideological dissonance that stems from the fallacy of linear development and identity-based nationalism, often understood from those who wield influence over the state and who have defined it within their own histories and culture.
Nations are not created equally and the legacies of colonialism in Africa are a reminder that to conceptualise a “nation” through the comparison of others distinct from the one of focus, actually hinders and fragments independent discourse. The momentary celebrations depicted in Khartoum calls us all to question the unfortunate “tradition” that outside observers inherently view as personifying modern Africa – the coup. Overthrowing a leadership is nothing new and the notion of “democracy” has proven difficult in practice ever since the first nations declared independence from colonial rule – Sudan being one of the first in 1956. The period itself was an uncertain “transitional period” and states have spent decades carving out “national identities” while reinvigorating the old rivalries of the pre-colonial period simultaneously.
Sudan is settled in a region of the world where many believe ancient man took his first steps and carved out the earliest civilizations yet the contemporary image one is accustomed to is that of a “self-perpetrating industry”. The simple explanation of the civil and political unrest is a government made up of an elite collection of political, business and military persons who had pitted itself against a marginalized civilian population consisting of subsistence farmers, impoverished urban dwellers and drought stricken herders, among others to control and influence vital economic forces that were meant to progress the country as developed and prosperous in the global market (Hutchinson 2005: 131).For Sudan, their political priorities have longed been overshadowed by conflicting social issues relating to ethnicity and religion which often filtered down to rigid codes of identity with harsh outcomes. Indeed, those who had lived through the decolonisation of their new “nation”, have a greater perception of how shifts in governance gradually redefine the state based on identity. For a regime, their focus becomes that of “political survival” where citizens are not viewed as people worthy of civil and human rights, but individuals owned by the state (Berridfe 2016: 385). During the 1950s and 1960s, governments of post-colonial states thought that transition could be accelerated by political and economic models based on a European development framework. However, this form of progress gradually caused dissonance amongst populations who saw these shifts as a series of rather disconcerting transformations from traditional identities – ones that had been varyingly repressed under colonial rule – to a move to a more “European” identity. By the 1970s, various forms of political and social unrest took place as a form of resistance to the “re-Europeanisation” of nation-states. As a result, policy became more about allegiance and nationalism based on idealised, “authentic” forms of African identity. However, this is not a reforming or liberating process as depending on who is in power, often they inherently favour their kin, tribe or allegiance that they descend from or at least aspire to replicate while marginalizing those “outside” this kind of national framework and the policies that result. You can find similar case studies in Congo (Mobutu’s Zaire), Gaddafi in Libya, Idi Amin in Uganda and Robert Mugabe in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe – Sudan is no exception.
In the aftermath of Omar el-Bashir’s ousting, the military have denounced the three-decade administration as corrupt, poorly managed and without justice. However, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) has indictment el-Bashir for crimes relating to the Darfur conflict, he has not given up, or been given up, for extradition as leaders have asserted that they will administered legal proceedings against the former leader themselves. The relationship between the Hague and Africa has been significantly contentious in recent years due to continuing global power imbalances and a sense that nations across the continent are deliberately being shut out of decisions relating to issues within their respective regions (Millis 2012: 407). There is a lingering anxiety towards the threat of European “intervention” which masquerades and “interference” or the reasserting of imperialism. Anti-imperialism sentiment didn’t disappear once states achieved independence, in fact it was something that became a notable element of policy as means to maintain independence. Broadly speaking, this is what’s called a process of authenticity. In order to “authenticate” national identities, one has to differentiate accepted traits and purge others that are perceived to be related to the “imperialist” condition. When el-Bashir came to power in 1989, he was continuing down a path of what he called “Arab revivalism”, exerting their own interpretation of Islam that would ensure their place as a major religious voice in Africa. However, an anonymous observer writing for The Economist (1995) noted an Orwellian vibe to the government that the rest of the world seemed to be unaware of, if not outright ignored. Sudan had been going down a more pious path of governance in order to exemplify a distinct identity of culture and society far removed from their colonial rulers as foreseen by leaders and influencers standing by. Before, el-Bashir, Jaafar Numayri, who was President from 1969-1985, implemented a new penal code as a means to “Islamise” the nation, he was embarking on a “retribution over rehabilitation” philosophy. Numayri, viewed the “reform” system of law as something that would not only starve the economy by diverting resources for prisons, courts and security but will accelerate the “cultural emancipation” of Sudan thus eradicate what he viewed as an artificial legacy of British colonial rule (Berridge 2016: 385). This proved to be a flawed policy because the focus on identity means that vital pillars of ensuring a functioning society are neglected – the economy stagnates which leads to a decline in domestic development thus the basic needs of citizens are ignored. All this accumulates to unrest because it is an inevitable product of political maladministration characterised by economic mismanagement and social neglect. Indeed, that same observer writing for the economist foreshadowed the following “the Sudanese will sooner or later change this government. It may happen by armed coup, or by protest in the streets, or by a steady erosion of the day-to-day co-operation”.
It is difficult to determine how the post al-Bashir period will develop, whether the transitional period will keep its promise of reforming the political structure to allow for democratic power to the people as well as addressing the economic woes or repeat the same episode that had characterise the nation for most of its modern history that leaves little reconciliation with their past. Democracy is a challenge even in the most stable nations as influence is given to the majority. A nation’s development rests on determining the broader and mutual political and social aspirations that help maintain society and not strictly focusing on “authenticating” an identity that will progress such goals. For now, the main issue is for the people is to continuously promote a dialogue of democracy and self-reliance between politician and citizen. This is still a delicately temperamental period prone to a power vacuum and the nation can’t afford to extend their initial moments of jubilation. Ultimately, the incentive for reformation and transitional commitment can allow Sudan to progress to a level of influence that would reinvigorate the international perception of the country as a key voice of diplomacy given its historic ties to the major spheres of international affairs – Europe, the Middle East and the rest of Africa. The world shouldn’t rush to perceive the nation’s outcomes without informing themselves of the complex processes and relationships that have shaped Sudan which in terms of development, democracy and modernity is not with a set discourse of certainty. No matter who observes the current situation in Sudan, one question always lingers, “How long will it last? For now, we let the people decide their own path.
