“I learnt that the nuclear weapons which gnaw the minds and bodies of human beings should never be used. Even the slightest idea using nuclear arms should be completely exterminated the minds of human beings. Otherwise, we will repeat the same tragedy. And we will never stop being ashamed of ourselves.”
Testimony of Hiroshi Sawachika, a witness of Hiroshima
Since the release of Little Boy (Hiroshima August 6, 1945) and Fat Man (Nagasaki August 9, 1945) onto Japanese cities to end World War II, the United States (US) and the (late) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have worked to ensure two things. Firstly, that the horrors created by the use of nuclear weapons could never happen again, and secondly if it did happen on their soil, or that of their allies, they could retaliate in any way (Walzer 2017, p. 268). As the tension that built up between the two powers transformed into the Cold War (1947-1991), the fear and suspicion of nuclear weapons that developed in the span of 44 years created both a relative peace compared to the conflicts of the early 20th Century. This in turn also created a culture of negativity surrounding the development and use of nuclear weapons. This article wishes to examine this negativity, how it was created, and how the culture surrounding nuclear weapons has ignored the creation of nuclear weapons which can be used to avoid mass murder of civilians. It will ultimately question; do ethical nuclear weapons exist?
You have got to be MAD
Developed during the Cold War period, the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is currently the only use of nuclear weapons globally. Both a strategic military term and a cultural understanding of nuclear weapons, MAD is based on the belief that nuclear weapons will result in Assured Destruction (AD) of a state if deployed, and the only way states can protect themselves from AD is to ensure that they have retaliatory capabilities by developing their own nuclear weapons (Sokolski 2004, p. vi). MAD thinking fuelled the Cold War arms race, as the US and USSR both developed and improved their nuclear weapons technology to each outdo the other, and ensure that if either engaged in nuclear war, it would be mutually assured that both states would perish (Rowen 2004, p. 6). This resulted in a relative peace between these powers, as they both believed that any use of their nuclear weapons would guarantee their own destruction.
This narrative of the strategic properties of nuclear weapons imprinted itself on the cultural understanding of these weapons on a global scale, that allows for little to no room for the discussion of when nuclear weapons can be used. Pop culture, such as the video RPG game Fallout, depicting an alternate universe in which the world is destroyed after a disagreement between the US and China becomes sour, present nuclear weapons as the bringers of the apocalypse. Non-government organisations, such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), spread the message that nuclear weapons must be abolished. It is enshrined in international regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which bans the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotes the reduction and elimination of existing caches. Even the classification of nuclear weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), comes with the assumption that these weapons can only cause ‘mass destruction.’ Globally, the narrative presents nuclear weapons as bringers of the apocalypse, keeping most of the world, even some international relations experts, in the dark and ignorant about the different types and uses of nuclear weapons that exist.
This narrative has ensured that there has not been a use of nuclear weapons within warfare since the dropping of Little Boy and Fat Man. This narrative however, is flawed. It is based off the assumption that all nuclear weapons will result in the loss of huge numbers of civilian life, or the inevitable destruction of nation states.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The uses of nuclear weapons come under two classifications; strategic and tactical. Strategic nuclear weapons are those that are used as tools for strategic mobility, assuming long term strategic thinking, such as deterrence of attack by another state. Tactical nuclear weapons on the other hand are those that can be tactically used against another state’s military in a conventional, combative atmosphere. Tactical nuclear weapons were developed with the intention that they be used under conventional circumstance, such as the use for air support of ground operations (Brodie 1954, p. 225). While this was the intention upon their creation, as the Cold War drew on, the development of tactical nuclear weapons was brushed aside in favour of strategic nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, there has since been a greater push to eliminate the stockpile of US tactical weapons within the US and on European soil (Norris and Kristensen 2011, pp. 64-65). This push to eliminate tactical weapons are the result of two intertwined analyses that state policy makers use to justify their actions; it is strategic and ethical. These analyses come at the result of common misconception about nuclear weapons, that has existed since the deployments of Little Boy and Fat Man and has rooted itself in global narratives on the uses of nuclear weapons.
Strategically, the development of improved nuclear weapons systems was fuelled during the Cold War by the principle of MAD. This principle also encapsulates a ‘no first use’ policy adopted by the Cold War powers, in which the primary use of nuclear weapons was to ensure both retaliatory strike systems, but also deterrence capabilities (McNamara 1983, p. 261). It was argued that tactical nuclear weapons would defy this first strike capability and lead to states deploying strategic nuclear weapons onto civilian areas, escalating the conflict, irrespective of if the original attack was aimed at legitimate military targets (McNamara 1983, p. 262). This assumption ties in with Walzer’s (2015, p 174) analysis of the idea of a limited nuclear war. He argues that tactical weapons can be ethical, as they do not necessarily have to be used on large numbers of civilians, or for the destruction of states. They are unethical however, because the culture that surround the use of nuclear weapon places them into a separate category to conventional weapons, a category of escalation and MAD, which can result in the eventual use of strategic nuclear weapons.
While Walzer’s ethical arguments are an interesting read, he does not explore the global narrative, nor the misconceptions that have created the assumption that nuclear weapons are destructive and unethical. Nor does his argument leave much room for states to change the status of tactical nuclear weapons and use them for their ethical value. The argument assumes that state policy makers themselves cannot separate the differences between strategic and tactical weapons. By changing the way that they think about nuclear weapons, state policy makers can still rationally conclude that any use of strategic nuclear weapons by either party will escalate to MAD and avoid their use if tactical nuclear weapons are deployed. This restructure would refocus the strategic argument for use of strategic nuclear weapons onto their use for instances such as, when the life of the state is in danger, rather than when any nuclear weapon is deployed. It could then allow the use of tactical nuclear weapons to be focused on ensuring peace in conventional warfare.
Ethical Nuclear Weapons
As a strategic policy for states in the future, it is my belief that tactical nuclear weapons, rather than being an unethical stepping stone to the destruction of the world, can be used to enforce peace. The bipolarity of the Cold War is argued, particularly by realist academic such as John Mearsheimer (2014, p. 356) to have resulted in a more peaceful world compared to the early 20th Century. While this may be true much of the world, the proxy wars that sprung up throughout the world, both as a result of the decolonisation process and as a result of both the US and USSR jostling for alliances with newly independent states, were not peaceful times for those involved in these wars. So while the strategic nuclear weapons systems, and the principle of MAD stopped the US and USSR from going to war directly, it did not stop conventional wars springing up around the world.
It is no use analysing what could have been, nor hypothesising what the world could be like if the US or USSR had decided to use tactical nuclear weapons on an enemy force to stop the inevitable escalation of conflict. But think about this for the future. Imagine a ground force of a states, or group of states, in a conventional war or on the ground of an escalating conflict, backed by tactical nuclear weapons. Rather than being backed by strategic nuclear weapons, whose use will either result in the use by another state, or public outcry against the use of such an ugly weapon, states can back their conventional forces with a weapon that can be used as a believable threat. Because of their small size, and limited destruction, states can use these weapons as merely a benevolent show of strength. As if to say, I won’t kill your civilians but I will decimate your conventional forces if you break the peace. Rather being unethical, the ability for these weapons to be put to limited use, can be more ethical by decreasing the number of conventional wars fought around the world.
A world without nuclear weapons, or wars, while desirable, is a utopia that cannot be achieved within at least my lifetime. The belief that all nuclear weapons, and their use will decimate the entire world is a socially developed construct that developed from the madness and fear that was the Cold War. Changing the way in which we define them, by recognising their different uses and conventional applications, can turn a utopian dream into a manageable course of action. Nuclear weapons, rather than being bringers of the apocalypse, are tools that are made, defined and used by us, and we should not succumb to the anarchy that their cultural construction has made them out to be.
Bibliography:
Brodie, B., 1954 ‘Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 217-229.
Mearsheimer, J. J. 2014 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics W. W Nortan & Company, New York.
McNamara, R. 1983 ‘The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons Perceptions and Misperceptions’ Survival, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 261-271.
Norris, R. S. and Kristensen, H. M. 2011 ‘US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 64-73.
Rowen, H. S. 2004, ‘Introduction,’ in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its origins and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, pp. 1-12.
Sokolski, H. S. 2004 ‘Preface in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, its origins and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, p. v-vii.
Walzer, M., 2015. Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations, Basic Books, New York.
