By Russell Reader –
This series aims to examine a potential war with China, exploring precedents for mutually destructive wars, what might precipitate a conflict, how it might unfold, and what the long-term consequences would be.
When one begins to compare our contemporary global political landscape with the pre-1914 world, the similarities are both eerie and disturbing.
Europe’s geopolitical balance that had been created in 1815 after the long Napoleonic Wars – was pushed aside by the rising power of Imperial Germany, whose military and economic growth was too much for the Concert of Europe to contain. In the preceding century, Britain had overcome its only rival, France, to become the global hegemon, enjoying primacy in the golden age of Pax Britannica. Britain’s navy was unchallenged at sea – protecting its vast empire and trading lanes. But in 1904, a naval arms race began between Germany and Britain. Germany too had an empire in Africa and the Pacific, and they understood that their colonies would be seized should they find themselves at war with Britain, so they endeavoured to usurp the Royal Navy’s supremacy as a means of protecting their interests. But in doing so, they unleashed the security dilemma because Britain feared that Germany meant to dominate them and undermine the naval protection that had shielded them from invasion for centuries. Hence, both powers became drawn into the Thucydides Trap, whereby an established great power feels threatened by arising power, refusing to accommodate their interests and a mutually destructive war becomes inevitable. In the case of pre-WW1 Europe, the interwoven alliance system meant that none of the continental great powers could remain neutral in the outbreak of war; magnifying the scale of a war to immeasurable standards.
Yet, liberals at the time thought that war was impossible. War would be expensive, and the belligerents would go bankrupt before anything decisive could happen. The navies of dreadnoughts and battleships were too expensive and irreplaceable to risking losing. European states were too dependent on trade, and it would deter them from fighting (Britain and Imperial Germany were each other’s biggest trading partners before the war).
What liberal thinking at the time didn’t account for was that the military leaderships’ attitude towards a potential war. They thought that the precise timetabling of troop mobilisation would give an advantage to whoever declared war first. Moreover, Germany feared war on two fronts with Russia and France, incentivising them to strike first in the hopes of knocking out France before the slow but fearsome Russian war machine could mobilise. To worsen the situation, war had become romanticised as a fundamental part of the human experience; a clash of passion that cleansed nations with an orgy of violence. Youth clamoured for their chance to prove themselves as warriors and men,unaware of the carnage of industrial warfare. It had been too long since the Napoleonic Wars for people to remember the suffering that war causes, and the economic hardship that follows it. Peace had made them eager for war.
Given the calamity that followed the First World War, and the Second World War a mere twenty years later – one might imagine that we’ve learnt our lesson about avoiding war between great powers at all cost. Yet much of the media we consume glorifies modern warfare, from popular shooting games such as Call of Duty that fetishise an impossible invasion of the United States, to critically acclaimed films like American Sniper that fail to critique America’s own invasion of Iraq. The violence we see through this media is whitewashed and sanitised, never truly confronting the viewer with the horrors of war. In video games, the player overcomes impossible odds, massacres hundreds of weak computer opponents and achieves victory single-handed. Ultimately, this portrayal of warfare reflects American arrogance that war will be easy and quick with the ‘indomitable’ might of the United States Navy, Army and Airforce.
Ironically, despite America’s enormous lead in technology, conventional military power, and their pre-eminent position as economic hegemon – China is fast becoming a bogeyman of Soviet proportions to the American public, as a potential military and economic rival that could even outmatch them by the end of the century. This is nothing new, the U.S. experienced a similar paranoia during the 1980s when it was predicted Japan would overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy.
Concerningly, contemporary China occupies a very similar position to Imperial Germany. China is an object of fear whilst simultaneously fearing its aggressive and bellicose rivals. Both powers have recently had their geopolitical vulnerabilities exploited by conquerors, (naval invasion of China by Imperial Japan, repeated invasions of German lands on the Northern European plain) thus, both have sought to eliminate those weaknesses even at the risk of war. As large manufacturing and export orientated economies, both powers have been reliant on imported food, resources and energy. Combined with a lack of naval tradition, this has left them particularly vulnerable to blockade; negating their advantage on land. Underscoring these vulnerabilities is a general international isolation, lacking formidable allies whilst facing off against a much larger coalition.
Taking these pressing weaknesses into account, much of China’s foreign policy can be explained as an awareness of its dire geopolitical situation. Just over the Himalayas to the South-East is the rising giant of India, a rival for influence in Indo-China and long-term security threat. To the North is Russia with whom it shares the sixth longest international border in the world. Whilst friendly for now, they have not always been so amicable (Sino-Soviet border conflicts). China also shares a border with Thailand, one of the U.S’s major non-NATO allies – as well as Vietnam, a country that has a great deal of historical animosity towards China. Most ominously, the United States Navy sails off its coast, presenting a fearsome menace along with its major non-NATO allies Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Furthermore, the United States military has major bases in Okinawa, Guam and Wake Island that operate long range stealth bombers and nuclear capable forces.
Given this, it is fair to say that China is strategically contained. China is too preoccupied by ensuring national security to engage in significant foreign adventures. In his analysis of Chinese foreign policy, Andrew J. Nathan suggests that:
“… those who subscribe to this alarmist view [of viewing China as a dangerous threat] are mistaking the Great Wall for a symbol of strength, and falling for the deception of the Empty Fortress… Despite its sheer size, economic vitality, and drive to upgrade its military forces, China remains a vulnerable power, crowded on all sides by powerful rivals and potential foes. China’s foreign policy is calibrated to defend its territorial integrity against antagonists who are numerous, near, and strong.”
Andrew J Nathan,
The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security
In comparison, the United States is one of the most geo-politically secure countries in the world – protected on both flanks by oceans and has land borders with subjugated neighbours to the north and south. Bolstering this invulnerability is Washington’s total dominance of the Western hemisphere since the 1940 “Destroyers for Bases Agreement” with Britain, where British bases in the Western hemisphere were ceded to the United States. This enviable security of the continental U.S has allowed Washington to have an extraordinarily aggressive foreign policy, and anything that isn’t completely interfering is passed off as ‘isolationist.’ Quite ironically, the United States finds any aggression, hostility or even mere non-compliance towards it intolerable and frequently responds with violence. When it can’t invade a weaker power, Washington usually surrounds it with allies and military bases, masking threatening behaviour as “protecting democracy”. Furthermore, Washington is becoming increasingly unilateral in its behaviour; running contrary to the“rules-based system” it expects other states to abide by. Hypocritically, it uses a media stranglehold to portray the actions of China as unbridled aggression, instead painting America as a force of freedom, democracy and peace.
Beijing recognises this and hopes to make their rise to great power status a peaceful one. Whether it will be able to achieve that in the face of American militarism remains a concern for the Chinese government. Such peaceful rises haven’t always succeeded.
Part 2 of this series will examine the prelude to a conflict between the United States and China, exploring motivations, impediments, catalysts, friction points and casus belli.
