Varying degrees of animosity have characterised the relationship between Taiwan and China. However, Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) has in recent decades become confronted with a particularly outwardly aggressive push toward unification. However, it too is pushing against the tide that China is riding. Elected in 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan remains robustly committed to the status quo in cross-strait relations. Indeed, in in her first interview with Western media in well over a year, she boldly made calls to ‘constrain China and minimize the expansion of their hegemonic influence.’
One China missing one thing?
Demands for unification are grounded in the ‘One China’ principle. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), pointing to the 1992 Consensus, assert that there is only ‘one China’ and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it, to which Taipei sharply disagrees. Indeed, the 1992 Consensus reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) political party then ruling Taiwan, was based on the shared understanding of ‘one China’ existing, although interpretations of this differ considerably. Despite this, the underlying tactic of the agreement is that Taiwan will not seek independence, since proving to be a roadblock in Taiwan’s attempts to move forward. Thus, whilst previously perceived as a breakthrough in cross-strait relations, the Consensus has today triggered an impasse between China and Taiwan. Yet, President Tsai Ing-wen has starkly refused to affirm the 1992 Consensus, refuting mainland China’s reiteration that talks with Taiwan would not resume without the agreement serving as the common political foundation.
Tsai’s recent foreboding remarks suggest that the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is become untenable; the seas between the two increasingly choppy. Indeed, whilst the Taiwanese President advocates the building of trust to create stability, Beijing’s response has remained unwavering. Chinese President Xi Jinping, directly preceding the 2016 elections, launched a pressure campaign on the island; cutting off official communications across the strait, stealing Taipei’s diplomatic allies, increasing the scope of military exercises in the waters surrounding the island, using economic leverage to punish Taiwan and ensuring Taiwan’s exclusion form international forums. Moreover, at the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping spoke about Taiwan in strident terms declaring that, ‘we will never allow anyone, any organisation or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any party of Chinese territory from China.’ Whilst the coveting of Taiwan is not new, its aim has grown.
However, the pressure campaigns suggest more than merely displeasure with the DPP Ing-wen government. Indeed it reflects the recognition by mainland China that support for unification is plummeting among the populating of Taiwan. And with collapsing support, the so called China Dream trembles.
Where is the lifeguard?
According to the One China policy, the US government takes no official stance on the relationship between Taiwan and China. With strategic ambiguity, the US acknowledges that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China, however it has never officially recognised Taiwan as part of China. This stance allows the US to maintain a de-facto relationship with Taiwan whilst leaving the Taiwan-China relation undetermined.
However, with unpredictable leaders come unpredictable fluctuations in policy. Indeed, in 2016 Donald Trump’s departed from protocol to take a phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, stunning observers. And whilst his motives were not clear at the time, his words certainly were; ‘I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things.’ His discontent with being bound by anything not directly advantageous to the US was met with both cautious optimism for Taiwan’s sake as well as outright praise for his refusal to grovel to Beijing. However critics interpreted the situation, one thing was abundantly clear; he was shaking up a delicate understanding of Taiwan that had underpinned decades of US-China relations.
Trump is certainly not the only President to attempt to use Taiwan as leverage with Beijing. History provides us telling examples. Indeed, prior to assuming office, Ronald Reagan campaigned on the platform that the Carter administration had conceded too much to China, promising that he would re-establish official relations with the ROC. When elected, Reagan’s tough stance was immediately confronted with the issue of arm sales to Taiwan, which Beijing objected to as an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty. In a bid to bargain with their Chinese counterparts, the Reagan Administration told Beijing it would be granted the status of a ‘friendly, non-aligned state’ making it eligible to purchase American arms if it complied with the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, whilst the reward was certainly appealing, Beijing immediately rejected the bargain because the deal was seen to have fundamentally undercut China’s sovereignty. And whilst the two nations eventually agreed to the 17 August 1982 Communiqué, the situation proved that China would not engage in bargains that call into question its sovereignty over Taiwan. Therefore, Trump’s attempt to use the One China policy as a haggling chip rests on the false assumption that China sees the policy as something to be negotiated.
It must also be noted that Reagan played his chips when China was weaker in the global area. Today, the PRC is a global power which both Chinese states as well as the international community cannot afford to antagonise.
Taiwan desires the official recognition of the US and greater diplomatic space in the international arena. Whilst President Tsai Ing-wen calls to action are bold, they are muffled by the force of Beijing and the One China policy. Whether Beijing will accept anything less than submission to their interpretation of the One China policy is unknown; but what is known is that rougher seas lie ahead.
