Since Britain voted to leave the EU two years ago, evergreen discussions about the identity and independence of the Kingdom’s four constituent nations seem to have assumed a new vigour. This is particularly relevant in Northern Ireland where Mary McDonald, the leader of nationalist party Sinn Fein, has attempted to utilise the Brexit vote as a means of lending renewed democratic and economic legitimacy to the nationalist cause and concomitant calls for a referendum on Irish reunification. However, her claims do not stand to reason. Whilst there exists a compelling economic justification for reunification, scrutiny of the referendum vote in Northern Ireland and the socio-political legacy of “The Troubles” allows one to see that the notion that Brexit will somehow catalyse Irish reunification is highly improbable.
The “democratic mandate” for reunification
Holistically, Northern Ireland voted for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union by a margin of 56% to 44%. This pales in comparison to Scotland, where the vote to remain within the EU won by a margin of 62% to 38%. Arguably, this is an un-compelling premise on which to predicate the notion that Northern Ireland’s vision of the European project is exponentially different to that of the UK-at-large.
Moreover, it should be noted that the vote to remain within the EU was highest among Northern Ireland’s Catholics and other religious minorities. As anyone with a rudimentary grasp of history will understand, Northern Ireland’s separateness from Ireland and continued membership within the UK is historically linked to the predominance of the Protestant Anglican faith. If the very reason for Northern Ireland’s “Britishness” is the predominance of Anglican Protestants, it would be instructional to examine how this demographic voted. 54% of the region’s Anglican Protestants reside in six of the eighteen constituencies into which the region is divided. These are Upper Bann, Lagan Valley, Fermanagh and South Tyrone, East Londonderry, Belfast South and Belfast East. A compelling “remain” vote in these constituencies would perhaps have lent credence to the notion that Northern Ireland’s approach to its place in the European community is at odds with that of the broader United Kingdom. In reality, these six constituencies were split in much the same way as the rest of the Kingdom; Upper Bann, Lagan Valley, and Belfast East all voted to leave by a margin of less than 5%. Fermanagh and South Tyrone and East Londonderry voted to remain by less than a margin of 5%. Only Belfast South proved to be an outlier, with 69.5% of constituents voting to stay.Holistically, Northern Ireland voted for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union by a margin of 56% to 44%. This pales in comparison to Scotland, where the vote to remain within the EU won by a margin of 62% to 38%. Arguably, this is an un-compelling premise on which to predicate the notion that Northern Ireland’s vision of the European project is exponentially different to that of the UK-at-large.
It would seem then that McDonald’s claim that the political interests of the majority-protestant north now definitively intersect with the Europhilic Republic of the south are exaggerated at best, and misguided at worst.
A pot of gold at the end of the border?
Both McDonald and former Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams are perhaps more justified in premising their renewed enthusiasm for Irish unification on the basis that the North’s economy will face significant challenges without access to the Single European Market. Proponents of this conception can draw on leaked treasury papers indicating that Northern Ireland’s economy would slump by as much as 15% over the next ten years if a “hard” Brexit was enforced.They may also note that exports to the Republic of Ireland account for 35% of the region’s exports to foreign nations. This equates to roughly 4 billion euros per annum. Although intra-national trade remains Northern Ireland’s largest single source of “export” revenue, international exports together account for just over 25% of the North’s economy. A “hard” border is therefore likely to have no small degree of impact on Northern Irish businesses. However, it is unlikely that the Republic of Ireland would have any real reason to push for a “soft” post Brexit border. Its exports to Northern Ireland amount to just over 1.3 billion dollars per annum. Whilst the re-imposition of a customs border would therefore be less than ideal, the Republic’s larger economy and greater reliance on trade with other European nations would not leave it as significantly disadvantaged as its northern neighbour.
“Troubles” from the past
Moreover, unlike the Easter Uprising and Irish Civil War fought almost one hundred years ago, “The Troubles” are an experience still painfully fresh in the minds of the generations who endured their bloody fallout. Whilst some may, with a degree of levity, point to this as being manifest in the chaos that accompanies the “Glasgow Derby” (the Celtic – Rangers soccer game with much crowd violence), one could more pertinently point to the Belfast riots of 2013. Then, a council decision to limit the number of days on which the Union Jack was flown atop the town hall was met with violent protests and wide-spread larceny. Whilst many protesters were indeed those of an age to recall the trauma of the troubles, the majority who took to the streets and were subsequently arrested were youths not much older than twenty. It would thus seem that today’s generation has not escaped the inheritance of what some have too readily dismissed as ‘historical enmities’. This is itself re-enforced by the largely segregated nature of Northern Ireland’s schools, where children attend religious schools or schools that are, due to their geographical situation, homogeneously populated. If the lowering of a flag was enough to generate latent discord amongst the old and young alike, one can only imagine what even a mildly successful vote to reunify with the Republic may trigger.
Conclusion
Since the days of Wolf Tone, the notion of a united Ireland has proven to be an ineradicable complex within the collective psyche of the emerald isle. Yet claims by Sinn Fein and other optimistically-minded nationalists alike that Brexit will somehow prove to be cause for this momentous change are unfounded. The percentage of “Ulstermen” who voted to “remain” was underwhelming, and whilst there are compelling economic justifications for a united Ireland, the monolithic political and cultural legacy of “The Troubles” is an impediment unlikely to be surmounted only twenty years after the brokering of a workable yet unstable peace. Indeed, these impetuous Irish nationalists would do well to heed the counsel of their great countryman Edmund Burke:
“Proceed by insensible degrees, so that you might have the benefit of change without the inconvenience of mutation.”
