“The interests of the State and the interests of Religion are two entirely different things”
Q. Cardinal Richelieu1
In the time of the Thirty Years’ War and the subsequent formation of the modern state system, Cardinal Richelieu sought to reform French national priorities by subordinating religion to the state, creating a more hegemonic identity.2 This marked a period when French sovereignty and regional power reached a powerful climax. Although appearing like contrasting historical episodes, it seems ironic that the Tuareg of Mali, once a significant part of the French Empire, is now afflicted with troubles like those of the former colonial power. Four centuries later, Cardinal Richelieu’s nativist, identitarian musing proves ever so relevant.
It’s important to note that there remains much conjecture in how African history is analysed and interpreted. It is often generalised as a series of ideologies, or ideals, which centre on establishing a modern African state. Much of the history is in the context of “national histories” and therefore only recounts a relatively small time-frame. To understand contemporary issues, we must consider various interconnecting factors influencing relationships that are not confined to one era. In the discipline of history, whether we analyse the scope of conquest, exploration, or trade, exchange remains paramount. It is this that influences society and leads us to question the introduction of new ideologies. As a result, exchange often prompts fear and antagonism towards what is considered a threat to autonomy and self-reliance. Let’s consider colonialism – the good, the bad, but the nevertheless significant. The Tuareg, a nomadic tribe that inhabit the Saharan regions of the modern states of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, were not defined by borders or state allegiance but by a pastoral nomadic existence that saw them control large sections of the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Until the early twentieth century, the Tuareg resisted many attempts of conquest by the French. However, after the empire cemented its hold on the region, the Tuareg gained a “privileged” status with titles such as “Lords of the Desert” and “The Blue People” (derived from their indigo coloured veils that would stain their skin).
While the French focused on economic aspirations, there were also other ideological aspirations at work in the Tuareg community: Islam. Through Arab migration, the spread of the Islamic faith was immense. On an initial interpretation, it is assumed various unitary characteristics were often intertwined to accommodate local customs.3 Although Islam is the main faith practised by the Tuareg, it is not central to their identity. Therefore, their enforcement of Sharia is not as strict.4 One main difference is the practice of veiling. In Tuareg society, women don’t veil but men do – it is not a symbol of modesty but one that signifies a passage into manhood. It is historically a matriarchal society where women enjoy active participation in many matters – including marriage, divorce, property ownership and inheritance. Colonial impact on the Tuareg is evident in the current conflict concerning their characterisation as Islamic fundamentalists. This is more complex than a society simply rejecting modernity.
The conflict in Northern Mali is another example of the fallacy of African unity in the postcolonial era where long-held ethnic imaginations clash with burgeoning national imaginations.5 Even if a national identity is influenced by common ethnic traits and history, these “commonalities” were from colonial influences – the language and political systems being of the culture of power. The common desire to be free from colonial powers was a compelling driver behind short-lived unity. Once colonialism ceased, the old hierarchies attempted to regain power.
The Tuareg political framework is a constellation of similarly structured tribal federations that have historically ruled their own regions.6 In simple terms, the Northern Mali conflict can be considered a secessionist movement. Mali declared independence from the French West Africa Federation in 1960. Since independence, there have been persistent uprisings in the country’s northern triangle which the Tuareg call Azawad, literally meaning “land of nomads.” Two significant uprisings took place in 1990 and 2012.7 The 1990 uprising saw the Malian government give “special status” to the region as an autonomous entity, but also paved the way for a power struggle to which the current conflict owes its legacy. After granted this “status,” the already fragile democratic transition had ceased and Tuareg rebels splintered off into smaller revolutionary groups. The uprising of 2012, which the current conflict stems from, resulted in the temporary seizure of Timbuktu from Ansar Dine (“Movement of the Defenders of the Faith”), a homegrown movement of Tuareg rebels proclaiming independence. This has been the turning point that has seen a surge in religious extremism. For example, the North African wing of Al-Qaeda aims to “impose Sharia law” as well as “liberate Malians from French colonial legacy.”8 Although these recent developments have portrayed rebellions as a religious conflict, it is yet another layer to the Tuareg’s struggles for autonomy. This has unfortunate consequences as they are essentially aligning themselves to a broader religious agenda that risks destabilising identity and independence. Although a peace treaty was signed between the government and Tuareg elders in 2015, the fighting continues in the form of ideological reprisals.
The current crisis in Mali asks us to reflect on history and concepts of society – tradition and the modern state. Much like Richelieu’s tenure, the main challenge is confronting deep-seeded separative forces and the self-interest of leaders across all sides of the conflict. For the Tuareg, another challenge is the perpetuation of archaic stereotypes which render them unable to properly engage in general state interests in resolving the current conflict and ultimately normalising violence as an integral part of the political process.9 If faith remains the focus, or the assumption, of the Tuareg’s aims for autonomy then they, as their name conveys, will ultimately be “abandoned by God.”
Endnotes
- D, Cannadine, The Undivided Past – Humanity Beyond Our Differences, New York, Random House, 2013, p. 43.
- New World Encyclopedia, (Website), 2017, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Cardinal_Richelieu (accessed 19 May 2018).
- D, Cannadine, The Undivided Past – Humanity Beyond Our Differences, New York, Random House, 2013, p. 31.
- B, Lecocq and G. Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali” from International Journal, Vol. 68 No. 3, 2013, p. 425.
- B, Lecocq, Disputed Desert Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali, Boston, Brill, 2010, p. 28.
- Lecocq and Klute, 2013, p. 425.
- K. Kone, “A Southern View on the Tuareg Rebellions in Mali” from African Studies Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2017, p. 53.
- “Mali Crisis: Key Players,” BBC Africa, published 12 March 2013 (accessed 21 May 2018).
- Lecocq and Klute, 2013, p. 428.
